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The Deconstitutionalization of the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
Prosecutorial Restraint Model
Margaret A. Berger*
Ironically, even as America is celebrating the bicentennial
of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court is continuing with its
dismemberment of the grand design of the Sixth Amendment.1
The Court has already greatly reduced the constitutional value
of one of the amendment's clauses-the right to confrontation.
It has transformed a constitutional guarantee into an eviden-
tiary doctrine "generally designed to protect similar values" as
the hearsay rule.2 Even though the Court maintains that "the
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1. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990). The statement was origi-
nally made in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1969), but in that case the
Court went on to explore the Clause's historical origins including the Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh trial. Id. at 156-58. For discussion of that trial, see infra text ac-
companying notes 58-59; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76
MINN. L. REV. 521, 525 (1992). Professor Imwinkelried writes:
Having equated confrontation with the right to cross-examination and
defined the right instrumentally, the next step in the Court's evolu-
tion of confrontation doctrine was predictable: It concluded that the
prosecution may substitute a showing of the accuracy or reliability of
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overlap [between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation
Clause] is not complete,"'3 the only function the Court currently
ascribes to the Clause is the promotion of accuracy in fact-find-
ing,4 a goal which is the primary objective of evidentiary rules.5
In 1992, the Court expanded the area of constitutional and
evidentiary congruence. In White v. Illinois,6 seven members
of the Court held that all hearsay admitted pursuant to a firmly
rooted hearsay exception automatically satisfies the Confronta-
tion Clause.7 Consequently, when a statement satisfies a
firmly-rooted exception, the court need not examine the con-
text in which the statement was made nor consider the availa-
bility of the declarant.8 Furthermore, the Court has previously
the declarant's hearsay statements for the right to cross-examine the
declarant at trial.
Id, at 525.
3. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 n.5 (1986).
4. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3151-52 ("'[A] per se rule of exclusion
would ... frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause.'"
(quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added))). The Court had previously insisted on this interpretation of
the function of confrontation. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415
(1985) ("[Ihe Confrontation Clause's very mission [is] to advance 'the accu-
racy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials."' (quoting Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. at 89); see also White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992) ("the
Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the promotion of the 'integrity of
the factfinding process.'" (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736
(1986)).
5. See FED. R. EVIm. 102. Rule 102 provides: 'These rules shall be con-
strued to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." Id.
6. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). The Court unanimously agreed that the Con-
frontation Clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements
made by a four-year-old child who was never produced by the prosecution nor
shown to be unavailable. Id at 744. The statements were made by the child to
her baby-sitter, mother, a police officer, an emergency room nurse, and a phy-
sician. Id- at 739.
7. The Court explained: "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guaran-
tees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule,
the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." Id. at 743. Justices Thomas and Scalia,
concurring, would have held that the kind of statements at issue in White
were not subject to the Confrontation Clause as they were not "formalized tes-
timonial materials" obtained by the prosecution. Id. at 747 (Thomas, J., con-
currring, joined by Scalia, J.); see also infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text
(discussing Thomas's concurrence).
8. In White, the statements had been admitted under Illinois' hearsay
exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of
receiving medical care. White, 112 S. Ct. at 740. The majority treated all the
statements uniformly for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis; it did not
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indicated that even a statement admitted pursuant to a non-
firmly rooted hearsay exception will pass constitutional muster
if it possesses sufficient indicia of reliability.9 Whether the
Court will insist on the declarant's unavailability in such a case
is not yet known,10 but it is clear that the Court views the as-
certainment of the truth as the unique concern of both the
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.
This insistence that the sole function of the Confrontation
Clause is to promote more accurate fact-finding ignores the his-
torical background against which the Clause was drafted and
overlooks the context in which it is placed. The majority of the
Court has forgotten, at least on a conscious level," that the
Confrontation Clause is a provision in the Sixth Amendment,
that the Sixth Amendment is a part of the Bill of Rights, and
that the Bill of Rights is part of the Constitution of the United
States. While in the recent White case, Justices Thomas and
Scalia, concurring, exhibited far more historical consciousness
than their colleagues, their analysis suffers from other infirmi-
differentiate on the basis of the person to whom the statement was made, and
it did not explore the context in which the various statements were solicited.
See icE at 741-43.
9. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). In Wright, the defendant
was convicted of lewd conduct with a minor after a jury found that the defend-
ant held her two-year-old and five-year-old daughters down to permit a co-de-
fendant to have sexual intercourse with them. State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224,
1224-25 (Idaho 1989), affid sub nom. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
Although the trial court ruled that the two-year-old girl was incompetent to
testify before a jury, under Idaho's residual hearsay exception the court none-
theless admitted the girl's statements to a pediatrician concerning instances of
sexual abuse. Id at 1225. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
holding that the doctor's testimony violated the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. Id at 1231. The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed. The majority and dissent agreed that trustworthiness was the touch-
stone of admissibility but disagreed in their assessments of the constitutional
trustworthiness of the statement and on the factors that may be relied upon in
evaluating reliability. Compare 110 S. Ct. at 3150 (majority opinion) (conclud-
ing that evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement does not sup-
port "a finding that the statement bears particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness") with 110 S. Ct. at 3153 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding
that "one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is trust-
worthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence").
10. In Wright, the majority "assume[d] without deciding that, to the ex-
tent the unavailability requirement applies in this case, the younger daughter
was an unavailable witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause."
110 S. Ct. at 3147; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 531-36 (discussing the
unavailability issue to date).
11. The cases illustrate, however, that the Court may at times be sensitive
on a less conscious level to constitutional concerns underlying the Confronta-




This Article argues that the Court's evidentiary approach
ignores a supporting role for the Confrontation Clause in re-
straining the capricious use of governmental power. This Arti-
cle assumes that one of the central concerns of the Bill of
Rights was to "guard... society against the oppression of its
rulers."' 3 As ably documented in a recent article, the Bill of
Rights can be read holistically as aiming to keep government
agents under control through provisions enhancing the moni-
toring and deterrence of governmental abuse, and ensuring the
ability of ordinary citizens to participate in this process.14
The Bill of Rights has not customarily been construed in a
unitary manner in which the meaning of the specific clauses is
illuminated by the aims and policies underlying the document
as a whole. 15 Instead, perhaps as a consequence of the parcel-
ling out of constitutional issues among separate law school
courses, the particular guarantees of the amendments have
been studied in a fragmented manner that obscures the grand
design of the Bill of Rights and its relationship to the Constitu-
tion,16 and is at odds with ordinary canons of statutory analy-
sis.17 Moreover, by focusing on the parts more than on the
12. See in fra notes 25-30.
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961), quoted in Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1132-33 (1991) (supporting Professor Amar's thesis that this latter
concern, "protection of the people against self-interested government" was the
central concern "in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights").
14. Amar, supra note 13, at 1132-33. While Professor Amar views the jury
trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment as furthering this holistic goal, he
does not look at the other provisions in the amendment in the same way. He
characterizes "speedy trial, assistance of counsel, confrontation, and compul-
sory process" as "nonstructural benefits." Id. at 1197-98. This Article demon-
strates that his thesis is consistent with the other provisions of the Sixth
Amendment as well.
15. Id. at 1132 ("[N]o legal academic in the twentieth century has at-
tempted to write in any comprehensive way about the Bill of Rights as a
whole.").
16. See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism" The Division of the
Bill of Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 295, 376 (1981). Gutman concludes that the
typically divided study of the Constitution splits the Gestalt describing rela-
tions between the state and its citizens. That split has the effect of restructur-
ing basic concepts of liberty embodied in the document as a whole. Id.
17. See 2a NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCnON
§ 46.05, at 103 (C. Dallas Sands, 5th ed., 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. Suth-
erland explains:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part
or section should be construed in connection with every other part or
[Vol. 76:557
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whole, we have lost sight of the Bill of Rights as a political doc-
ument with a principal objective of restraining the power of the
government vis-a-vis the individual.
In a criminal trial, the government's might gives an enor-
mous advantage to the prosecution, an advantage that many of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights are designed to keep in
check.' 8 Allowing the government to use evidence obtained
through private interviews markedly enhances the potential for
abuse. The prosecution has the incentive and the power to
shape the witness's answers in accordance with its theory of the
case.
The opportunity to cross-examine the government agent to
whom the out-of-court statement was made does not provide
adequate protection. The agent will often be both a profes-
sional investigator with experience in obtaining statements and
a professional witness adept at preserving the secrecy of the
government's operations. The government should not be per-
mitted to hide behind the cloak of the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause. Furthermore, the creation of evidence in
secret hinders the jury from scrutinizing a process in which ju-
rors should play a role as political participants. The means
used by the government to prosecute crime is a matter of public
concern.1 9
Hearsay statements procured by agents of the prosecution
or police should therefore stand on a different footing than
hearsay created without governmental intrusion.20 The Con-
frontation Clause should bar hearsay statements elicited by
section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to
confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.
Id; see also Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (quoting United
States v. Heirs of Boisdor6, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850) ("In expounding a
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.")).
18. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("Much of the Bill of Rights is designed to redress the advantage that inheres
in a government prosecution.").
19. See Amar, supra note 13, at 1187-89 (discussing the jury's role in ac-
quiring information about the affairs of government).
20. See Roger W. Kirst, The Procedural Dimensions of Confrontation
Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485, 487 (1987) (suggesting that the Confrontation
Clause is "a limit on the procedure the government [can] use" to prosecute and
does not relate solely to the reliability of the contents of the statement); cf
FED. R. EviD. 803(b) & (c) (omitting from public record hearsay exception
matters observed by law enforcement personnel and factual findings resulting




governmental agents unless the declarant is produced at trial or
unless special procedures discussed below are followed.21 This
interpretation is consistent with other Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence and would enable the Confrontation Clause to oper-
ate as an integral part of the Sixth Amendment scheme that
enables the public to scrutinize the process by which the gov-
ernment obtains and uses evidence in a criminal trial. It would
complement the other rights that the amendment grants-trial
by jury, a public trial, specification of the charges, and right to
counsel-by providing yet another mechanism for making cru-
cial workings of the government visible and keeping the over-
whelming prosecutorial powers of the government in check.
I do not claim that I can prove that the drafters of the Bill
of Rights intended such an interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause. Little information exists about precisely what the con-
cept of confrontation signified in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries in England and the colonies.2 Nor is an
intentionalist approach advocated even if the historical record
were considerably more clear.2 3 This Article suggests, however,
that an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause as part of a
mechanism for controlling the central government is histori-
cally plausible, is consistent with a unitary view of the Bill of
Rights, and is compatible with the results of the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, even if not always in accord with
what the Court has said. Most important, viewing the right to
confrontation as part of a package of rights concerned with pro-
tecting the people against governmental oppression promotes
significant values and restores a valuable purpose to the
clause.2 In criminal prosecutions, the ability of the accused
and the public to monitor, curb, and expose prosecutorial abuse
21. See discussion infra part III.
22. See, e.g., Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1
TEX. TEcH L. REV. 67, 67 (1969) ("Oddly ... the right of an accused 'to be
confronted by the witnesses against him' is seldom mentioned in early histori-
cal documents. The precise source of this use of the word 'confront' is ob-
scure."); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe confrontation clause comes to us on faded parchment.").
23. See Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Fram-
ers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 349, 351-57 (1989).
In addition to providing useful references to the literature on original inten-
tion, id. at 349, Professor Finkelman makes a compelling argument for why it
may be impossible to determine the original intent of the framers with regard
to provisions about which there exists far more contemporary history than ex-
ists concerning the Confrontation Clause. Id.
24. See discussion infra part III.A.
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remains of utmost importance, despite the passage of two hun-
dred years since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Justice Thomas's and Scalia's reading of history in White v.
Illinois25 resembles the approach taken in this Article in some
respects. Responding to a suggestion contained in the amicus
brief filed by the United States, Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion endorses an interpretation of the phrase "witness
against [the defendant]" that would limit the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause to certain types of "testimonial materials that
[were] historically abused by prosecutors." 26 According to Jus-
tice Thomas, such an approach would be "faithful to both the
provision's text and history."' '
The acknowledgment of English history's role in shaping
the right to confrontation and the recognition of restraint of
the prosecution as a core purpose of the doctrine are in accord
with this Article's approach. But the concurring opinion differs
from the proposals here advocated in a number of significant
respects.
In the first place, although this Article agrees that state-
ments elicited by the government require special treatment,
this conclusion does not require exempting all other hearsay
from Confrontation Clause analysis as Justice Thomas con-
tends.2s The proposals advocated in this Article are responsive
to the Bill of Rights' concern with restraining the might of the
government; other objectives of the Bill of Rights and the Sixth
Amendment support restrictions on hearsay even though the
government played no role in its creation.29
Second, Justice Thomas's opinion takes a formalistic rather
than a functional approach to the kind of prosecutorially ob-
25. 112 S. Ct. 736, 744-48 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurrring, joined by Scalia,
J.).
26. I& at 744.
27. Id. The opinion briefly reviews some English history and alludes to
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Id. at 745. It also argues that "[a]s a matter of
plain language ... it is difficult to see how or why the Clause should apply to
hearsay evidence as a general proposition." Id. at 746.
28. Id. ("The standards that the Court has developed to implement its as-
sumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of hearsay evidence
have no basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment."). The majority in White
explicitly rejected Justice Thomas's narrow reading of the Confrontation
Clause on the ground that the Government's argument "comes too late in the
day" in light of the Court's many decisions equating the hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause. I& at 741.
29. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not A Mere
Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 615 (1992).
1992]
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tained statements that would be covered. Instead of focusing
on the circumstances in which the statement was obtained, as
this Article does, the concurring opinion in White would draw
distinctions based on the form in which the statement was me-
morialized, limiting the protection of the Clause to statements
"contained in formalized testimonial materials."30  This ap-
proach exalts the sixteenth and seventeenth century format in
which inquisitionally obtained statements were recorded, over
the dangers posed by modern methods of prosecutorial
questioning.
Third, this Article suggests that a more stringent test than
presently mandated should be required when the prosecution
seeks to introduce extrajudicial statements that it has elicited.
Although the concurring opinion does not explicitly discuss this
issue, certainly its thrust is to whittle away at the right to con-
frontation by greatly limiting the ambit of the doctrine. In that
sense, this Article and the opinion have little in common.
Rather than seeking to curtail the operation of the Clause, I be-
lieve that we must apply it more vigorously if we are to achieve
the Bill of Rights' objective of protecting individuals against
governmental overreaching.
Two kinds of cases in which hearsay statements often play
a prominent role demonstrate the need for a stringent
prosecutorial restraint model. These cases involve prosecutions
for child sexual abuse and for drug offenses. In the past few
years, the United States has experienced an epidemic of child
sexual abuse prosecutions. Many of these cases have received
extensive media attention. Especially as regards allegations of
sexual abuse in schools and day care centers, the ensuing public
outcry has led to enormous political pressures on prosecutors to
secure convictions. In several recent notorious cases, the
prosecutorial response has been likened to the over-zealousness
encountered in the Salem Witch trials.31 Observers claim that
30. This formulation is considerably narrower than the Government's pro-
posal. The Government in its amicus brief had argued that the Confrontation
Clause should apply only to statements made to prosecutors in contemplation
of legal proceedings. White, 112 S. Ct. at 747 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas responded by stating that "[a]ttempts to draw a line between state-
ments made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made
would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties." Id Instead he sug-
gested the following formulation: "the Confrontation Clause is implicated by
extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testi-
monial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions." Id.
31. See, e.g., RICHARD WEXLER, WouNDED INNOCENTS 300-02 (1990); Alex-
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prosecutors or their agents cajoled, coaxed, and threatened chil-
dren during interviews, often with special techniques that pos-
sess a high potential for improper suggestion.32 Furthermore,
the prosecution's experts often have publicly funded jobs and
rely on studies financed by government research grants.33 Thus
they are dependent on the epidemic's continuance.3
If prosecutors succumb to political pressures when inter-
ander Cockburn, Out of the Mouth of Babes: Child Abuse and the Abuse of
Adults, 250 THE NATION 190, 191 (1990).
32. Commentators have decried the tactics of prosecutors and investiga-
tors in several recent notorious cases. In the McMartin case, in which the
teachers at a nursery school were charged with sexual abuse, the jurors who
acquitted the defendants of 52 counts of molestation criticized investigators' in-
terviewing procedures. Robert Reinhold, 2 Acquitted of Child Molestation in
Nation's Longest Criminal Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990, at Al. Jurors
stated that the interviewers' leading questions prevented the jury from hear-
ing the children's story in their own words. Seth Mydans, For Jurors, Facts
Could not be Sifted from Fantasies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990, at A18. Accord-
ing to the jurors, who were shown videotaped interviews of the children, the
investigators used leading questions and "pressure bordering on coercion to
confirm the stories of other children." Seth Mydans, Child Abuse: Some Pros-
ecutors Win, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A12; see also PAUL EBERLE & SHIR-
LEY EBERLE, THE POLrrcs OF CHILD ABUSE 17-91 (1986) (discussing and
reprinting portions of the McMartin preliminary hearing); Cathleen Decker,
McMartin Case Puts Reiner in Political Hotseat, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at
A29 (suggesting that politics played a pivotal role in the district attorney's de-
cision to retry the defendants on the remaining thirteen counts). In another
notorious case in Bakersfield, California, the state attorney general's office
conducted an investigation after several defendants had been convicted of
child molestation and were serving multiple life sentences. The investigation
revealed that children were over-interviewed and pressured into making state-
ments which later proved to be false. Jay Mathews, In California, a Question
of Abuse; An Excess of Child Molestation Cases Brings Kern County's Investi-
gative Methods Under Fire, WASH. POST, May 31, 1989, at D1, D2. Children re-
ported that investigators threatened to take them away from their families
until they told the "truth." Id. at D2-D3; see Eric Malnic, Bakersfield Torn By
Horror Stories of Child Molesting; Cult Killings, Cannibalism Reported Lack
of Evidence Hints at Witch Hunt, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1985, at A3. In yet an-
other case, a Minnesota prosecutor was publicly rebuked for mishandling an
investigation in which charges of sexual abuse against 21 of the 24 defendants
were dropped and two other defendants were acquitted. E.R. Shipp, Prosecu-
tor in Sex Case to Stay in Office, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, at A16.
33. Cf. David C. Raskin & John C. Yuille, Problems in Evaluating Inter-
views of Children in Sexual Abuse Cases, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TES-
TIMONY 184, 186-87 (S.J. Ceci et al. eds., 1956) (noting that it is "common
practice" for case worker interviewers to assume that allegations of sexual
abuse are true).
34. See Josephine A. Bulkley, The Impact of New Child Witness Research
on Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY,
supra note 33, at 208, 213 n.24. Bulkley notes that two of the most recent stud-
ies have been funded by grants from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention and from the National Institute of Justice. Id.
1992]
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viewing potential child witnesses in sexual abuse prosecutions,
the jury, as the public's representative, needs as much informa-
tion as possible. An institutional bias that skews the
prosecutorial process needs to be exposed. Consequently, in
these kinds of cases the Confrontation Clause should be inter-
preted to restrain prosecutors from using suggestive, manipula-
tive questioning techniques. Even if the interviewed child is
subsequently produced as a declarant, the jury may be unable
to ascertain to what extent the interrogation has tainted the
child's initial perception and memorys 5 Hence, in the case of
children, prophylactic measures discussed below are needed to
make Confrontation Clause protection meaningful.6
The war on drugs certainly is politically inspired by the
government's perception of what the public wants. As with
child sexual abuse cases, prosecutors are under tremendous
pressure to get results. In addition, drugs are related to the
government on another level. They are intertwined with our
international affairs, as in the cases of Manuel Noriega and Oli-
ver North, and with our financial institutions in elaborate
money laundering schemes.37 Public exploration of the under-
lying relationships is hampered by the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the co-conspirator's exception, which immunizes all
declarants from production at trial,38 even when their state-
ments were elicited by a federal agent or an informant.3 9 The
jury and the public need to know about the government's role
in creating this evidence. The assumption that all drug defend-
ants deserve what they get should not blind us to the need to
35. Cf. United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir.), cerL
denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3577 (1992). The majority in Spotted War Bonnet affirmed
a conviction in a child sex abuse case because the hearsay declarants, the al-
leged child victims, actually testified. 1d. at 1473. The dissent by Chief Judge
Lay stressed the suggestive and coercive atmosphere in which a clinical psy-
chologist paid by the FBI conducted interviews. Id- at 1476-77.
36. See infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
37. Cf. Midland Nat'l Bank v. Conlogue, 720 F. Supp. 878, 879 (D. Ken.
1989) (plane leased to customs agents for undercover work was found filled
with marijuana after it crash landed). The trial judge in Midland sent copies
of the convicted drug dealer's testimony to the Iran-Contra special prosecutor
as evidence that the government acquiesces in illegal drug transactions. Dan
Terry, As the Nation Debates Abortion, A Judge is Cast as the Moderator, N.Y.
TmEs, Aug. 9, 1991, at A12, A18.
38. See discussion of co-conspirators exception infra at notes 156-71 and
accompanying text.
39. Thirty-four of 47 opinions in the United States Court of Appeals deal-
ing with the co-conspirators exception in 1990 were rendered in drug prosecu-
tions. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76:557
PROSECUTORIAL RESTRAINT
watch what the government is doing-both because of govern-
mental involvement in the narcotics trade and because the gov-
ernment's activities may pose a threat to individual liberties.40
Part I of this Article considers the meaning of confronta-
tion from the vantage point of English history and the Ameri-
can colonial experience.4 ' Part II examines the Supreme
Court's approach to the Sixth Amendment and the Confronta-
tion Clause. It concludes that the Court's evidentiary standard
of reliability leads to illusory constitutional protection. Part III
then suggests how statements made to prosecutorial authorities
should be treated in order to further the policies expressed in
the Bill of Rights.
I. THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The many commentators who have sought to clarify the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause have almost all viewed
the Clause in the abstract, separately from other Sixth Amend-
ment and Bill of Rights guarantees.42 From this isolationist
perspective, they have concluded that the significance and
scope of the right to confrontation cannot be gleaned with any
assurance from explicit statements made about the meaning of
40. Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown. The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the
Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 907 n.93 (1987) ("[D]rug dealers today
have become as much a magnet for the fears and suspicions of the public as
the 'subversives' of the McCarthy era."). Judge Weinstein, in United States v.
Riley, 906 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1990) (Weinstein, J. dissenting), explained:
We are seeing a fateful confluence of decreased concern for private
constitutional rights, increased pressure on law enforcement officials
in a war on drugs, and sharp advances in forensic science. Sensitivity
to the dangers to civil rights is required. It is a paradox that as the
Eastern Europeans are escaping from the horrors of dictatorships that
ignored civil rights and are expressing enormous esteem and respect
for our legal protections, these protections are increasingly being den-
igrated in our country... Mhe power now afforded permits the gov-
ernment and the police to target individuals, particularly those who
are pariahs of the moment, and to ignore their traditional rights in
the home. As in the past, the law should stand firm to protect even
those the majority deems unworthy. Reduce the rights of these few,
and we threaten the rights of all.
Id. at 855.
41. Obviously, an Article of this length cannot explore several centuries
of English history and the colonial experience in any depth. Part I of this Ar-
ticle attempts briefly to summarize the developments in England and the colo-
nies of which we know the framers were cognizant.
42. The most notable exception is an article by Howard W. Gutman. See
Gutman, supra note 16.
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confrontation prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. The
Clause was barely debated while the Sixth Amendment was
under consideration,43 and American documents predating the
Sixth Amendment rarely discussed the purpose of confronta-
tion. In looking for English antecedents to the notion of con-
frontation, most commentators have used a separatist approach
as well. They have sought an explanation for the term's emer-
gence in the American colonies without looking at the totality
of the transformation of English criminal procedure between
the Tudor era and the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and the
similarly important changes occurring in American law and
politics in the eighteenth century.
A. ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS
Although we now tend to think of the Sixth Amendment
as a procedural and evidentiary code concerned with guarantee-
ing the common criminal a fair trial,44 it must be remembered
that the concepts incorporated in the amendment, and the
other original amendments, developed in a political context in
England.45 To understand the criminal trial provisions in the
Bill of Rights, one must appreciate how extensively the English
crown relied on the criminal process to protect itself against its
enemies. 46 The right to confront witnesses then emerges as a
43. Id. at 332 n.181.
44. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) (Sixth
Amendment right to counsel exists to protect right to a fair trial); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
a fair criminal defense); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Cornfron-
tation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 581-83 (1988)
(describing the Sixth Amendment as a fundamental guarantee of a fair crimi-
nal proceeding).
45. Furthermore, very little information was available to the colonists or
anyone else about ordinary criminal proceedings. See John H. Langbein, The
Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 263, 264 (1978) ("As a
generalization that requires only modest qualification, it can be said that the
law reporting tradition was not extended to ordinary criminal trials until the
nisi prius reports of the late eighteenth century.").
46. Professor Levy, after approving an unattributed remark by a federal
judge that the framers "had in mind a lot of history which has been largely
forgotten today" when they wrote the self-incrimination clause into the Fifth
Amendment, goes on to comment:
The remark applies with equal force, of course, to the right of repre-
sentation by counsel, trial by jury, or any of the other, related proce-
dural rights that are constitutionally sanctified. With good reason the
Bill of Rights showed a preoccupation with the subject of criminal jus-
tice. The framers understood that without fair and regularized proce-
dures to protect the criminally accused, there could be no liberty.
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product of the same complex historical forces that gave rise to
the other rights embodied in our Constitution and Bill of
Rights.47 Only then do the Sixth Amendment provisions make
sense as part of a comprehensive constitutional scheme to re-
strict the unbridled exercise of governmental power.
Between the sixteenth century and the early eighteenth
century, the common law system adopted and then rejected in-
quisitorial practices in criminal proceedings. Before the Tudor
era, an open, public process operated in the common law
courts.48 At least until the middle of the sixteenth century,
"publicity bathed the English common-law procedure. '49
With the ascent of the Tudors, the English crown began to
exercise more control over its enemies by importing techniques
from the civil law into the indigenous, essentially accusatorial,
system of criminal procedure. °O Criminal proceedings took on a
more inquisitorial slant with the use of preliminary examina-
tions and increased reliance on prerogative courts. The Star
Chamber, for example, used no juries and dispensed with pro-
They knew that from time immemorial, the tyrant's first step was to
use the criminal law to crush his opposition.
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 431 (1968); see also
James F. Stephen, Criminal Procedure from the Thirteenth to the Eighteenth
Century, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORY 443, 515 (1908)
(noting that in the period between 1554 and 1637, when criminal procedure in
the common law courts lacked many of the protections for the accused that
later emerged, and many state trials took place before the Star Chamber,
"there was no standing army, and no organized police on which the Govern-
ment could rely" and the Government was not strong enough to be generous).
47. Professor Levy explains that "the history of the right against self-in-
crimination is enmeshed in broad issues of great import: the contests for
supremacy between the accusatory and inquisitorial systems of criminal proce-
dure, between the common law and the royal prerogative, and between the
common law and its rivals, canon and civil law." LEVY, supra note 46, at 42.
The same can be said for the rights set forth in the Sixth Amendment, includ-
ing the right to confront adverse witnesses.
48. A known accuser began the proceedings by instigating the prosecu-
tion; presentment by the grand jury followed. Thereafter a written indictment
was furnished to the accused, who ultimately received a public trial before a
jury. See 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 620-23 (4th
ed., 1935).
49. LEVY, supra note 46, at 34.
50. In the inquisitorial system used on the Continent, accusation and pros-
ecution rested with the court; there was no definite accuser and the charges
were neither formally specified nor revealed to the accused. The inquisitorial
system's emphasis on secrecy continued throughout the proceedings. The
names of witnesses against the accused were not revealed; the accused was
tried by secret interrogatories, often obtained through the use of torture, and
even the final sentence was not publicized. See 5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 170-75 (2d ed., 1937).
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cedure in extraordinary cases, using interrogations designed to
trap the accused into a confession.m 5 By the turn of the eight-
eenth century use of these inquisitorial features in English
criminal proceedings had diminished in the common law courts,
and the Star Chamber had been abolished.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, justices of
the peace conducted preliminary examinations in ordinary
criminal proceedings at common law. The justices-govern-
ment officials who exercised police, administrative and judicial
functions-privately interrogated the suspect, his accusers, and
the witnesses against him.52 These examinations were then in-
troduced into evidence to the detriment of the defendant who
had neither the assistance of counsel nor the ability to call wit-
nesses on his behalf. The accused still benefitted from having
his case heard publicly and from having the jury act as decision
maker.-
In cases of great political importance, however, the Privy
Council, or the judicial members of the Council, examined the
suspect and the other witnesses.5 5 At trial, proof usually con-
sisted of reading statements that had been made out of court,
such as depositions, confessions of accomplices, and letters.56 In
his history of the common law, Stephen concluded that this
prosecution on the basis of written statements "occasioned fre-
quent demands by the prisoner to have his 'accusers,' ie. the
witnesses against him, brought before him face to face."' 57
In Sir Walter Raleigh's 1603 trial for conspiring to over-
throw the King of England, the principal "witness," Lord Cob-
51. LEVY, supmr note 46, at 182. In Star Chamber proceedings, the accused
could be committed to prison indefinitely pending trial. He was required to
swear the oath ex offio that he would answer all questions truthfully, both
orally and in writing-even though he was ordinarily not informed of the
charges against him, nor allowed counsel. After swearing the oath, and with-
out counsel, the defendant was confronted with interrogatories based on infor-
mation furnished through the secret examinations. I& at 182-84. Any
inconsistencies between the accused's answers and the interrogatories were
used to prove that he had violated his oath, and to force a confession. Torture
was sometimes used. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 178-88.
52. 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 225-26 (2d
ed. 1938).
53. 1 at 228.
54. Id at 229.
55. Stephen, supra note 46, at 490.
56. 9 HomDswoRTH, supra note 52, at 226 ("[I]n these trials the evidence
against the prisoner was carefully prepared by the depositions of witnesses
taken before the Council or the judges.").
57. Stephen, supra note 46, at 491.
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ham, never testified before the jury. Instead, the prosecution
relied almost exclusively on witnesses testifying to statements
that Cobham had made to officers of the Crown when they ex-
amined him and on answers to interrogatories that Cobham
had subscribed. Raleigh objected, stating the "Proof of the
Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let
him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and I have
done."58 Although Sir Walter Raleigh's complaint is the best
known instance of a defendant requesting production of the
witness against him,59 the same unsuccessful demand was made
in other famous political trials reported in the State Trial se-
ries, such as Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's earlier trial for trea-
son in 155460 and John Lilburne's 1637 trial for libel before the
Star Chamber. 61
58. 2 COMPLrE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783 1, 16-17 (T.B. Howell ecL, London, T.C. Hansard
1816) [hereinafter STATE TRIALS].
59. While some commentators credit the Sir Walter Raleigh trial as giving
rise to the common law right of confrontation, see, e.g., FRANCIS H. HELLER,
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1969); Kirst, supra note 20, at 490, others view
this attribution as a myth, see, e.g., Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Con-
frontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
CRiM. L. BULL. 99, 100 n.4 (1972), or a mistake, see Larkin, supra note 22, at 70.
But see White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurrring,
joined by Scalia, J.) (discussed supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text).
60. It was reported that in 1554 Throckmorton objected when he saw in
the courtroom a person whose preliminary examination had been produced
against him 'aster Croftes is yet living, and is here this day; how happeneth
it he is not brought face to face to justify this matter, neither hath been all
this*time?" 1 STATE TRIALS, supra note 58, at 875-76; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 52, at 216. Another writer reports:
For though the Prisoner strongly insisted on... That which requireth
the Witnesses to be brought face to face upon the Trial, the Council
for the Crown went on in the method formerly practiced, reading Ex-
aminations and Confessions of Persons supposed to be Accomplices,
some Living and Amesneable, others lately Hanged for the same
Treason.
MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION FOR
THE TRIAL OF THE REBELs IN THE YEAR 1746, IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY; AND
OF OTHER CROWN CASES 234 (Michael Dodson ed., 3d ed.) (London, E. & R.
Brooke 1792).
61. 3 STATE TRIALS, supra note 58, at 1315-22. Lilburne pled before the
Star Chamber.
I know it is warrantable by the law of God, and I think by the law of
the land, for me to stand upon my just defence, and that my accusers
ought to be brought face to face, to justify what they accuse me of....
Sir [the Earl of Dorset], I know you are not able to prove, and to
make that good which you have said.-I have testimony of it, said he.
Then, said I, produce them in the face of the open court, that we may
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According to Wigmore and his followers, these proceedings
were unfair because the prosecutions rested on rank hearsay, a
concept that was not recognized until considerably later. In
Wigmore's view, the admission of out-of-court statements
against Raleigh and the other state trial defendants unjustly
prejudiced them because they had no opportunity to test the
credibility of the declarants by cross-examination. Wigmore
equated the accused's right to have witnesses present before the
jury with the right of cross-examination. 62 Consequently, when
cross-examination is not needed because the hearsay is suffi-
ciently reliable without adversarial testing, then production of
the declarant is excused.63 In this view, confrontation is an evi-
dentiary rule that functions solely to further the ascertainment
of the truth; it does not operate independently of the hearsay
rule in the case of out-of-court statements.M
A closer look at the state trial proceedings demonstrates
that the need for cross-examination is not the only dimension
of the problem. Examined in a historical context, the defend-
ants' complaints have less of an evidentiary than a procedural
flavor. Review of the theories of proof prevalent then, the ra-
tionale for the hearsay rule, and the nature of the reforms that
occurred in response to the state trials, indicates that the de-
fendants' complaints speak more to the secrecy and potency
with which the Crown was exercising its powers than to qualms
about the inability to cross-examine declarants.
It is not until considerably after the seventeenth century
state trials that the law of evidence recognized cross-examina-
see what they have to accuse me of; and I am ready here to answer for
myself, and to make my just defence.
Id.
Similarly, a 1653 pamphlet stated: "The ancient known right and law of
England being, that no man be put to his defence at law, upon any man bare
saying, or upon his own oath, but by presentment of lawful men, and by faith-
ful witnesses brought for the same face to face .... ." The Just Defense of John
Lilburn (1653), in THE LEVELLER TRACTs: 1647-1653, at 450, 454 (William Hal-
ler & Godfrey Davies eds., 1944).
62. 5 JOHN H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRLS AT COMMON LAW § 1397 at
158 (Chadbourn rev. ec 1974). Wigmore explained that "[tihere never was at
common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing called confronta-
tion as distinguished from cross-examination." Id.
63. Id. "Moreover," Wigmore wrote, "this right of cross-examination thus
secured was not a right devoid of exceptions." The rule sanctioned "by the
Constitution is the hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all the excep-
tions that may legitimately be found, developed, or created therein." Id.
64. Id. § 1396, at 154 ("The satisfaction of the right of cross-examination
... disposes of any objection based on the so-called right of confrontation.").
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tion as one of the basic requisites for ensuring accurate proof.65
The significance of cross-examination did not become apparent
until lawyers were permitted to represent defendants in crimi-
nal cases.66 Because the state trial defendants did not have the
assistance of counsel on their behalf, measuring their demands
against a standard of effective cross-examination seems some-
what of an anachronism.
Before cross-examination assumed its central role, the oath
was regarded as the chief guarantor of evidentiary reliability.
"[Tihe opinion of the time seems to have been that if a man
came and swore to anything whatever, he ought to be believed
unless he was directly contradicted."6 7 As noted earlier, in the
state trials, proof often consisted of affidavits and depositions.68
Nevertheless, defendants demanded to have the "witnesses"
produced even though the absent witnesses had sworn to tell
the truth, suggesting that more was at stake than the need to
test the declarants' credibility. Furthermore, the practice of
proving cases through examinations taken under oath before a
justice of the peace or a coroner lost favor prior to the estab-
lishment of the hearsay rule.6 9
65. Wigmore claimed that the hearsay rule was completely developed by
the early 1700s. Id. § 1364, at 12. Professor Langbein appears to regard this
contention with some skepticism. He suggested that evidentiary rules such as
the hearsay rule did not develop until lawyers appeared upon the scene. Upon
reviewing criminal trials in the Old Bailey, Langbein found that judges knew
"that there was something wrong with hearsay, but even as late as the 1730s
they do not appear to have made the choice between a system of exclusion or
one of admissibility with diminished credit." Langbein, supra note 45, at 302;
see also Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spitr" Adversary
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 572 (1990)
('y the 1730s, the rudiments of the hearsay rule were established and at least
sporadically applied.").
66. See Langbein, supra note 45, at 307 ("At least as early as the sixteenth
century, and throughout the seventeenth century, defendants in political trials
were complaining of the disparity that resulted when the prosecution was rep-
resented by counsel while the defense was denied it." (citation omitted)).
Langbein suggests that the availability of counsel in criminal trials was a con-
dition to the development of cross-examination and evidentiary doctrine such
as the rule against hearsay. Id at 300-02, 306.
67. 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
399-400 (London, MacMillan 1883).
68. See text accompanying supra note 56.
69. WILLAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429
(1978) (London 1721). Although he acknowledged that reports on the state tri-
als indicate that depositions of witnesses were admitted in treason and felony
cases in Tudor times, Hawkins stated as "settled" that examinations given
under oath were admissible only if the maker was dead, unable to travel, or
kept away by the accused. Id.
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Sources closer in time than Wigmore to the state trials sug-
gest that the objections to Cobham's statements may have
rested at least in part on dissatisfaction with inquisitorial meth-
ods of obtaining proof. Gilbert's The Law of Evidence,70 the
first analytical treatise on the subject of evidence, provides a
clue about the dangers inherent in sworn out-of-court state-
ments procured by agents of the government. Gilbert is repre-
sentative of views at the turn of the eighteenth century when
the hearsay rule was viewed at most as a rule of best evidence
and little significance was accorded to the need for cross-exami-
nation.7 1 In writing disparagingly about proof by deposition,
Gilbert stressed the methods by which depositions were taken:
[Tihe Credit of Depositions ceteris paribus falls much below the Cred-
ibility of a present Examination viva voce, for the Examiners and
Commissioners in such Cases do often dress up secret Examinations,
and set up a quite different Air upon them from they would seem if
the same Testimony had been plainly delivered under the strict and
open Examination of the Judge at the Assizes.7 2
Although Gilbert expressed doubt about the reliability of
the statement-an evidentiary concern-this passage suggests
that he disapproved of the secret inquisitorial method of ob-
taining proof. Admitting evidence that the government has cre-
ated in this manner interferes with the ability of the jury to
check pressures the government may have brought to bear
against the witness.73 Distrust of the witness to whom the
statement was made does not implicate the hearsay rule, nor is
it the business of the hearsay rule, or indeed of evidentiary
rules, to devise procedures to protect the accused against undue
pressures by prosecutors. If the demand for confrontation in
the state trials rested in part on preventing the prosecution
70. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Garland Pub. 1979)
(1754).
71. See id. at 112; Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham The
Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1149, 1151-60
(1990) (discussing the significance of oath). The enormous respect accorded to
statements under oath in part accounted for an accused not being permitted to
call sworn witnesses on his behalf, as it was thought that the value that would
be accorded to such testimony would be to the Crown's detriment. See Lands-
man, supra note 65, at 597-98 (discussing how Thomas Peake's A Compendium
of the Law of Evidence shifted emphasis from oath to cross-examination as the
central guarantor of the worth of oral testimony).
72. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 45. Gilbert states that hearsay statements
should not be allowed as direct evidence, but voices no objection to the admis-
sion of hearsay statements given under oath as corroboration of a witness's tes-
timony. Id. at 107-08.
73. Cf. 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 58, at 22 (suggesting that torture was
used in obtaining evidence against Raleigh).
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from creating evidence in secret, then confrontation was ex-
pected to play a role that the hearsay rule performs only
indirectly.74
Further support for according confrontation a procedural
function in restraining the government emerges upon examina-
tion of the rationale for the hearsay rule. Its objective is to pro-
vide the jury with more reliable information so that a more
accurate verdict will result. If confrontation is viewed solely as
an evidentiary doctrine, then the error in Sir Walter Raleigh's
trial consists of his not having been able to establish his inno-
cence because of his inability to cross-examine his accuser.7 5
Confrontation obviously possesses more than a purely eviden-
tiary dimension, however, if the failure to produce a witness
whose statement was crafted by the government amounts to er-
ror even when the statement possesses adequate indicia of
reliability.
In searching for a historical rationale for confrontation, it
is interesting to note that John Lilburne was one of the polit-
ical defendants who called for his accusers to be produced.76
74. Of course, sometimes the hearsay rule may bar evidence created by
the prosecution. But as the discussion below indicates, hearsay exceptions
have been interpreted to authorize the admission of prosecutorially produced
evidence. See infra notes 152-65, 215-16 and accompanying text.
75. Whether Raleigh was in fact guilty has been the subject of some de-
bate. Although many commentators assume that he was railroaded, see, eg.,
Graham, supra note 59, at 100, others express doubt about his innocence, see,
e.g., 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 52, at 227-28 (1931).
76. See supra note 61. In his 1649 trial for high treason held before the
extraordinary Commission of Oyer and Terminer, Lilburne also constantly de-
manded the assistance of counsel. He stated-
I know very well, and I read it in your own law-books, such a preroga-
tive, as that in cases of treason no counsel shall plead against the king,
hath been sometimes challenged to be the king's right by law; but, let
me tell you, it was an usurped prerogative of the late king, with all
other arbitrary prerogatives and unjust usurpations upon the people's
rights and freedoms, which has been pretended to be taken away with
him. And Sir, can it be just to allow me counsel to help me to plead
for my estate, the lesser, and to deny me the help of counsel to enable
me to plead for my life, the greater?
4 STATE TRLs, supra note 58, at 1269, 1301-02. For a recent discussion of
John Lilburne's demands, see Michael K. Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The
Levellers and the American Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 359, 370
(1991). Curtis states:
Lilburne, citing Coke and Parliamentary declarations against the
King, insisted that due process comprised a cluster of legal rights of
the accused including apprehension by a legal warrant, the right
against self incrimination, confrontation of one's accuser, imprison-
ment only for a specific and previously forbidden crime, jury trial,
and presentment by grand jury.
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Lilburne is far more famous for another demand he made: his
repeated objection to the prosecution's use of the oath ex officio
led to the oath's abolition and the recognition of the privilege
against self-incrimination.77 In his many trials LAlburne de-
fended himself by arguing procedure and rights.78 He was un-
deniably guilty of the crimes with which he was charged.79 His
objection to the oath hinged on the unfairness of being forced
to create evidence against himself, evidence that might be in-
consistent with the evidence the government had created
through secret examinations of witnesses.80 The objection to
the oath ex officio and the demand for confrontation are thus
intertwined; both can be interpreted as reflecting distaste for
an inquisitorial system that makes it advantageous for the gov-
ermnent to create evidence in secret.81 The inability of the de-
fendant to counter that advantage effectively, given the power
of the government, renders the procedure objectionable even
Id.
77. See LEVY, supra note 46 (discussing Lilburne's trials and their effect
on the recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination).
78. In his 1649 trial Lilburne also demanded a public trial, 4 STATE TRI-
ALS, supra note 58, at 1271-74, challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the
ground that it was not a regular common law court, id. at 1274-78, 1283, ob-
jected to the jury not being from the county in which the offense was commit-
ted, id. at 1283, demanded a copy of the indictment, id. at 1282-83, 1296, and
demanded the right to call witnesses, id. at 1309.
79. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 67, at 365-66; see LEVY, supra note 46, at 273,
276.
80. See 1 STEPHEN, supra note 67, at 366.
81. Bernard D. Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CH. L. REV. 687, 687-88 (1951).
Meltzer explains:
The origins of the privilege are associated with the struggle of En-
glishmen against the High Commission and the Star Chamber whose
techniques included not only interrogation of suspects under the oath
ex officio, but also the imprisonment and torture of recalcitrants....
Because it symbolizes the right of the individual not to be hounded by
the state, the privilege has seemed more important, and limitations on
its scope have seemed more alarming, whenever liberty has been
threatened.
Id. Of course, many other justifications have been put forth for the privilege
against self-incrimination. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063 (1986). The
classic attack on the privilege by Bentham and his followers-that it should be
thrown out because it does not foster the truth-is not dissimilar to the
Supreme Court's diminution of the right to confrontation: because the only
value the Court sees served by the Confrontation Clause is more reliable evi-




when the government's method of applying pressure ferrets out
the truth.
The conclusion that confrontation emerged as part of a pro-
cedural package for diminishing the government's inquisitorial
powers is strengthened by a review of other developments that
limited the Crown's prerogatives. The Court of Star Chamber,
which relied exclusively on inquisitorially obtained statements
and did not utilize a jury, was abolished in 1641.82 In the com-
mon law courts, the role of the jury was gradually strength-
ened,8 3 and the procedural process that had given the Crown so
great an advantage over the accused changed in response to de-
mands made in the state trials and the new political climate.
Legislation passed in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution
of 1689 confirmed the reforms.84
Not surprisingly, in light of their political genesis, these re-
forms originally applied only in prosecutions for treason.85 By
1696, defendants accused of high treason won the right to a
copy of the indictment, to the assistance of counsel, and to sub-
poena witnesses to testify in their defense.8 6 Parliament clari-
fied statutes that required treason to be proved by two
witnesses by ensuring that two witnesses had to be present at
the trial.8 7 In 1702, the right to have witnesses sworn on behalf
of the defendant was extended to felony prosecutions.8 8
Although the privilege of counsel was not statutorily extended
to persons accused of a felony until 1836 in England, from the
1730s on defense counsel were increasingly allowed to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.8 9
Thus, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, a pack-
age of procedures had evolved in England to curtail the power
of the Crown. The next section considers whether the develop-
82. LEVY, supra note 46, at 281-82.
83. In Bushell's case decided in 1670, the principle was established that ju-
rors could disregard the evidence without suffering punishment. See id. at 38;
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNTr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 134
(5th ed. 1956).
84. See HELLER, supra note 59, at 10.
85. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 52, at 235.
86. Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3 c.3; see HELLER, supra note 59, at 9-10;
9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 52, at 235 (1931); LEVY, supra note 46, at 321.
87. 4 WILIAM BLAcKsTONE, COMMENTARiES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
*352 (University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765); see also James G. Wilson,
Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Con-
victed of Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 99, 106 (1983).
88. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 52, at 235.
89. Langbein, supra note 45, at 311.
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ments in England could have affected the framers in their for-
mulation of the Bill of Rights.
B. THE COLONIES
While Sir Walter Raleigh's trial is often mentioned as a
major influence on the drafting of the Confrontation Clause,
some commentators have expressed doubt whether the effect of
an event in 1603 would be manifested in 1791.90 Their skepti-
cism is fueled by the omission of any mention of confrontation
in the seventeenth century colonial documents that set forth
the rights to be granted in the various colonies.91 The colo-
nists's knowledge of seventeenth century events is of some im-
portance. If the colonists did not perceive a connection
between the notion of confrontation and the reduction of the
inquisitorial powers of the Crown, then confrontation looks
more like Wigmore's purely evidentiary doctrine than a proce-
dure that also aspires to prevent the government from leaning
on witnesses and concealing the process from the jury.92
Analyses that stress the silence of the seventeenth century
90. Several commentators are skeptical of the influence Sir Walter Ra-
leigh's trial had on confrontation theory. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 22, at 70;
Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U.
FLA. L. REv. 207, 208-09 (1984).
91. For instance, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, which is
considered a forerunner of the federal Bill of Rights, is silent about confronta-
tion. This document, although written by the colonists, was, however, subject
to Crown veto. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BIL OF RIGHTS: A DocuMEN-
TARY HISTORY 49-50 (1971). Demanding rights against the Crown in political
trials was unlikely to be feasible or expedient while Charles II remained on
the throne.
92. Professor Jonakait suggests yet a different role for the Confrontation
Clause. He argues that the Clause "is not a minor adjunct of evidence law, but
is one of a bundle of rights that assures the accused the protection of our ad-
versary system. It assures the accused the right to the adversarial testing of
the prosecution's evidence." Jonakait, supra note 44, at 622. The purpose of
this right is "to assure that the jury will not overvalue the evidence against the
defendant." Id Consequently all out-of-court statements must be excluded
unless the declarant is produced "except when the prosecutor establishes the
lack of a reasonable probability that the accused's cross-examination of the de-
clarant would have led the jury to weigh the evidence more favorably to the
accused." I& Although Professor Jonakait's adversary system rationale is
preferable to the reliability formula of the Supreme Court, his analysis is
troublesome on two grounds: statements elicited by the government should
stand on different grounds than other statements for reasons pointed out in
this Article, and his conclusion substitutes another instrumental rationale that
allows dispensation with confrontation when the function of confrontation has
been otherwise satisfied. The danger is that determining whether evidence
will be misweighed to the accused's detriment in the absence of cross-examina-
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colonial documents pay insufficient attention to how the ideol-
ogy of the framers evolved. They overlook that if, as suggested,
confrontation is part of a pattern of procedural reforms that
gradually curtailed the inquisitorial powers of the Crown, then
the outlines of that pattern did not emerge clearly until after
the statutes enacted in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolu-
tion. Furthermore, the first edition of the state trials reports,
which included the trials of Raleigh, Wilburton, and Lilburne,
did not appear until 1719.93 Perhaps most importantly, the rel-
evance of the English experience may not have been fully rec-
ognized until the 1760s when Parliament started to enact
inquisitorial methods to control the colonists. In 1765 the
Stamp Act enlarged the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty
courts, allowing them to sit without juries and to examine wit-
nesses in chambers upon interrogatories.94 Shortly thereafter
Parliament resolved that all colonial traitors would be tried in
England-thereby depriving them of a jury from the vicinage,
the ability to call witnesses on their behalf, and virtually ensur-
ing that the Crown's evidence would be in the form of deposi-
tions.95 Viewed against the backdrop of increasing knowledge
about English criminal procedure and the gains of the Glorious
Revolution, this reversion to inquisitorial procedures may have
struck the colonists as a step backwards.
tion is as malleable a standard for trial judges as determining the reliability of
evidence, and ultimately turns into an evidentiary standard as well.
93. Three more editions followed by 1781. See 12 WILLIAM S. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 127-30 (2d ed. 1938) (describing the vari-
ous editions). Until the late eighteenth century very few reports of criminal
trials were available except for the state trials. See Langbein, supra note 45, at
264-65.
94. In 1768 John Adams defended John Hancock, who had been sued in
Admiralty by Jonathan Sewall, the advocate general, for penalties regarding
the alleged smuggling of wine. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 173-210
(L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). A patriot pamphlet, A Journal
of the Times, commented7 on the Star Chamber method of interrogation, and
the examination of witnesses in chambers. I& at 182 n.35. Reports of the Han-
cock trial were widely reported in the colonies' newspapers. See OLIVER M.
DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE (1768-69) 18-84 (1936) (discussing
reports in New York and Boston newspapers). Adams wrote in his copy of his
argument: 'Examinations of witnesses upon Interrogatories, are only by the
Civil Law. Interrogatories are unknown at common Law, and Englishmen and
common Lawyers have an aversion to them if not an Abhorrence of them." 2
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra, at 207; see also id at 341 ('"The Exami-
nation of the Prisoner himself (if not on oath) may be read as Evidence against
him; but the Examination of others (though not on oath) ought not to be read
if they can be produced, viva voce.").
95. See Larkin, supra note 22, at 71-72.
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It seems abundantly clear that the framers were familiar
with the battle against an overly inquisitorial system. The his-
tory of the common law was influential in furnishing the Revo-
lutionary generation with what Professor Bailyn has termed a
"framework of historical understanding."96 To the colonists,
the evolution of the common law in the period from Magna
Carta to the Glorious Revolution recorded the successful strug-
gle to strengthen the rights of citizens vis-a-vis the Crown.9 It
provided the colonists, and hence the framers, with an explana-
tion of how England had ultimately arrived at a "constitution"
capable of preserving liberty by securing rights to different
members of the community.98
The colonists certainly knew of the historical developments
in England that transformed criminal procedure and reduced
the ability of the Crown to tyrannize its subjects. By the eight-
eenth century, lawyers trained in England who were cognizant
of the reforms brought about by the Glorious Revolution were
96. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 31 (1967). Bailyn explains:
To the colonists [the law] was a repository of experience in human
dealings embodying the principles of justice, equity, and rights; above
all, it was a form of history--ancient, indeed immemorial, history;
constitutional and national history; and, as history, it helped explain
the movement of events and the meaning of the present.
Id.
97. See LEVY, supra note 46, at 338 ("In American thinking, the common
law was a repository of constitutional principles that secured individual rights
against government intrusion."); see also The Proceedings of the Convention of
the Representatives of the New Hampshire Settlers 16 (1776), in JULIUS GOE-
BEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK 446 (1944) (pamplet attacking a special act passed by the New York Leg-
islature in 1774 that enacted a version of the English riot act). The pamplet
stated. "May it be considered that the legislative authority of the Province of
New York had no Constitutional right or power to make such Laws and conse-
quently that they are Null and Void from the Nature and Energy of the Eng-
lish Constitution." Id. It closed with the following verses:
When Caesar reigned King at Rome,
Saint Paul was sent to hear his Doom,
But Roman Law in a criminal Case,
Must have the Accuser Face to Face,
Or Caesar gives a flat Denial-
But here's a Law made now of late;
Which destines Men to awful Fate
And Hangs and Damns without a Trial ....
Id. n.300.
98. See BAILYN, supra note 96, at 175-98 (discussing how the notion of the
unwritten constitution which the colonists thought had evolved in England be-
came transformed into a desire for a written constitution).
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professionally active in the colonies.9 Furthermore, the colo-
nists were well read in the law; they knew the work of com-
mentators and had access to the state trial reports,1°° standard
treatises such as Gilbert's, and works by Foster and Hale that
relied heavily on the state trials. 0 1
Any doubt that the framers knew about the evolution of
English criminal procedure vanishes upon examination of
Blackstone's Commentaries, a book that "played a unique role
in the development of the fledgling American legal system."'10 2
The Commentaries, first published in 1765-69, were originally
imported; in response to growing demand, an American edition
99. Id. at 30-31. The lawyers who came to the colonies at the end of the
seventeenth century were knowledgeable about the procedural reforms
achieved after the Glorious Revolution. See HELLER, supra note 59, at 20. Pro-
fessor Heller explains that many of the lawyers who arrived in the colonies in
the closing years of the seventeenth century had been trained at the Inns of
Court in London,
and brought with them, applied, and enforced the procedural modifi-
cations enacted in England after the Revolution of 1688. Thus these
reforms, the new liberality as to witnesses and counsel for the ac-
cused, became associated in the minds of the people with the aims of
greater freedom that had caused the overthrow of the Stuarts and
Tories.
Id.; see also CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911).
100. Symposium, Historical Development of the American Lawyer's Li-
brary, 61 L. LIMR. J. 440, 444 (1968) [hereinafter Historical Development]. One
of the cases contained in the State Trial series was cited by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as early as 1786. See Belt v. Dalby, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 167 (Pa. S.
Ct.).
101. BAILYN, supra note 96, at 30-31. Foster, issued in 1762, discussed the
Raleigh case in his Treatise, stating that Raleigh's "Trial, having been long
since Printed and prefixed to His History, hath been more generally Read and
Censured than Others, I do not see, that That Case... did in point of hardship
differ from Many of the Former." FOSTER, supra note 60, at 234-35; 2 MAT-
THEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 284-86 (P.R.
Glazebrook ed., Professional Books 1971) (1736) (discussing the advantages of
oral testimony in open court compared to written information); see also Curtis,
supra note 76, at 392 ("Probably the ideas of the Levellers, ideas that grew out
of and merged with other seventeenth century ideas of liberty and law, con-
tributed significantly, if not always directly, to the mixture of historic liberties
and natural rights that became one American tradition.").
102. Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at iii.
In public political literature written between 1775 and 1790, Blackstone was
the second most frequently cited secular writer after Montesquieu. See DON-
ALD S. LuTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONALISM 142-45 (1988); see
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (2d ed. 1985)
('When Blackstone's Commentaries were published (1765-69), Americans
were his most avid customers. At last there was an up-to-date shortcut to the
basic themes of English law. An American edition was printed in 1771-72, on a
subscription basis, for sixteen dollars a set; 840 American subscribers ordered
1557 sets--an astounding response.").
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was reprinted in Philadelphia in 1771-72.103 Blackstone com-
mented on the right to compulsory process, the right of the ac-
cused to know the charges, the role of counsel,1° 4 and the
accused's right to be tried by jurors of the vicinage. His discus-
sion of these procedures appears in Chapter 27 alongside his ac-
knowledgment of the central role of the jury in protecting
citizens against governmental overreaching, especially in crimi-
nal trials.10 5 Blackstone also cross-referenced his discussion of
juries in civil cases, noting that "[w]hat was said of juries in
general, and the trial thereby, in civil cases, will greatly
103. Historical Development, supra note 100, at 447.
104. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *349-54. He criticized the English
rule that still did not provide for counsel in felony cases at this time. See Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-66 (1932) (discussing origins of right to counsel
provision in Sixth Amendment).
105. Blackstone's characterization of trial by jury "as the grand bulwark"
of an Englishman's liberties is a conclusion with which the drafters of the Bill
of Rights were obviously in agreement. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *349.
His "panegyric" to the virtues of the jury coincided with the view of the au-
thors of the Bill of Rights, who placed juries at the heart of three of the
amendments. Furthermore, Blackstone perceived trial by jury as fulfilling
two different functions: first a trial by jury was the best mode of decision for
investigating the truth of facts, 3 id. at *379-80, and second it was a mechanism
for preserving the liberties of the people against the prerogative of the Crown.
Id. at *349. As to the second function, he wrote:
The antiquity and excellence [of jury trial] .... hold[s] much stronger
in criminal cases; since, in times of difficulty and danger, more is to be
apprehended from the violence and partiality of judges appointed by
the crown, in suits between the king and the subject, than in disputes
between one individual and another .... Our law has therefore wisely
placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial
by jury, between the liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the
crown.
Id at *349; see also Amar supra note 13, at 1183 (the key role of the jury in the
Bill of Rights "was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental over-
reaching").
Blackstone's explanation of the political role of the jury has been echoed
by the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the right to jury trial provision
of the Sixth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968).
The Duncan Court explained:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to pre-
vent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitu-
tions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to
protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate ene-
mies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher author-
ity. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent
judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted).
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shorten our present remarks." 1°6
In Chapter 23 in the midst of a "panegyric" to juries,
Blackstone considered the advantages of the English system of
requiring proof by oral testimony in open court before the par-
ties, their attorneys, the public, the judge, and the jury. The
passage, in which he mentioned "the confronting of adverse
witnesses," begins:
This open examination of witnesses -viva voce, in the presence of all
mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than
the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an
officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that
have borrowed their practice from the civil law- where a witness may
frequently depose that in private which he will be ashamed to testify
in a public and solemn tribunal. There an artful or careless scribe
may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his
depositions in his own forms and language; but he is here at liberty to
correct and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which he can
never do after a written deposition is once taken. Besides the occa-
sional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to
the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a
formal set of interrogatories previously penned and settled and the
confronting of adverse witnesses is also another opportunity of ob-
taining a clear discovery, which can never be had upon any other
method of trial.'
0 7
Although Blackstone acknowledged confrontation's role in
determining the truth, he viewed the doctrine institutionally as
part of the common law heritage that is antithetical to the se-
cret examinations that are a component of inquisitorial proce-
dures. 08 Blackstone may well not have discussed confrontation
106. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *344.
107. 3 1& at 345 (citations omitted).
108. The excerpt from Blackstone recited above, see text accompanying
note 107, was quoted in its entirety in one of the anti-federalist essays of Cin-
cinnatus published in the New York Journal in November-December 1787. Es-
says by Cincinnatus (1787), in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALisT 5 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981). Cincinnatus read the Blackstone passage as explaining
how the common law system, including the confrontation of witnesses, worked
to curb tyranny. Immediately after the quote, he wrote:
They who applaud the practice of civil law courts, must either have
seen very little of such practice not to know that it is liable to infinite
fraud, corruption, and oppression. As far as it prevails in the English
system of jurisprudence, from which we derive ours, it is a remnant of
ecclesiastical tyranny. The free and pure part of the system, that is
the common law courts, have ever cautiously guarded against its en-
croachments, and restrained its operation. All great judges have rep-
robated it, except Lord Mansfield. He indeed, has been as desirous of
extending it in England, as he was of extending parliamentary power




at all but for its interrelationship with the role of the jury,
which both he and the framers of the Bill of Rights viewed as
the principal safeguard of a people's liberties. 109 The Commen-
taries otherwise demonstrate no concern with the law of evi-
dence even though this area of the law was in the midst of
change.11 0
The popularity of Blackstone and the relevance of confron-
tation as part of a parcel of politically derived rights perhaps
explain why George Mason inserted a Confrontation Clause
into the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights,' which became
109. "[A] celebrated French writer [Montesquieu], who concludes, that be-
cause Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have lost their liberties, therefore those of
England in time must perish, should have recollected that Rome, Sparta, and
Carthage, were strangers to the trial by jury." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87,
at *379; see also Matthew Hale, History of the Common Law (1713), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUION 248 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
(praising testimony of witnesses in open court and not before "a Commissioner
or Two, and a couple of Clerks" and that is oral, "and not in Writing, wherein
oftentimes, yea too often, a crafty Clerk, Commissioner, or Examiner, will
make a Witness speak what he truly never meant, by his dressing of it up in
his own Terms, Phrases, and Expressions"). Hale praises this procedure for
producing the truth and relates this process to the right of the jury to ignore
the evidence; he notes that oral testimony provides jurors with "full informa-
tion" and notes that "they are not bound to give their Verdict according to the
Evidence or Testimony" and may "pronounce a Verdict contrary to such Testi-
monies, the Truth whereof they have just Cause to suspect." Id.
110. Blackstone has been faulted for not being "alert to the slow rise of the
law of criminal evidence." Thomas A. Green, Introduction to 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 87, at ix. It is interesting to note that Story in his Commentaries
made the same criticism about the Sixth Amendment-that it was insuffi-
ciently sensitive to evidentiary concerns. After paraphrasing the provisions of
the Amendment by stating- "The trial is always public; the witnesses are
sworn, and give in their testimony (at least in capital cases) in the presence of
the accused," Story states:
Without in any measure impugning the propriety of these provisions,
it may be suggested, that there seems to have been an undue solici-
tude to introduce into the constitution some of the general guards and
proceedings of the common law in criminal trials, (truly admirable in
themselves) without sufficiently adverting to the consideration, that
unless the whole system is incorporated, and especially the law of evi-
dence, a corrupt legislature, or a debased and servile people, may
render the whole little more, than a solemn pageantry.
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 109, at 296.
111. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 109, at 6. It provided:
That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to de-
mand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with
the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unani-
mous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be compelled to
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the model for similar bills in seven other colonies.- 2 Although
virtually no legislative history exists for these provisions, the
anti-federalist debate protesting the absence of a Bill of Rights
in the proposed federal constitution is illuminating. It indicates
that the absence of confrontation and the other procedures now
detailed in the Sixth Amendment were viewed in toto with the
right to trial by jury as necessary to safeguard civil liberties
against governmental abuse. For instance, an essay by the Im-
partial Examiner that appeared in the Virginia Independent
Chronicle argued:
[I]f you pass this new constitution, you will have a naked plan of gov-
ernment unlimited in its jurisdiction, which not only expunges your
bill of rights by rendering ineffectual, all the state governments; but
is proposed without any kind of stipulation for any of those natural
rights, the security whereof ought to be the end of all governments.
Such a stipulation is so necessary, that it is an absurdity to suppose
any civil liberty can exist without it.... For instance, if Congress
should pass a law that persons charged with capital crimes shall not
have a right to demand the cause or nature of the accusation, shall
not be confronted with the accusers or witnesses, or call for evidence
in their own favor; and a question should arise respecting their au-
thority therein, - can it be said that they have exceeded the limits of
their jurisdiction, when that has no limits; when no provision has
been made for such a right? - When no responsibility on the part of
Congress has been required by the constitution?
1 13
give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty
except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
Me
112. Larkin, supra note 22, at 75-76.
113. The Impartial Examiner, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 108, at 185 (emphasis in original); see also Debate in Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention (Jan. 30, 1788), in 5 THE FouNDERS' CONSTrruTION,
supra note 109, at 260. During the debate in the Massachusetts Ratifying Con-
vention Holmes complained of deficiencies with regard to the trial by jury pro-
vision. He continued:
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; whether the criminal is
to be allowed the benefit of counsel; whether he is to be allowed to
meet his accuser face to face; whether he is to be allowed to confront
the witnesses, and have the advantage of cross-examination, we are
not yet told.... On the whole, when we fully consider this matter,
and fully investigate the powers granted, explicitly given, and spe-
cially delegated, we shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling
them to institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tri-
bunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of Christendom: I
mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition.
Id. Echoing similar concerns, one colonist asserted:
Security against expost facto laws, the trial by jury, and the benefits
of the writ of habeas corpus, are but a part of those inestimable rights
the people of the United States are entitled to .... men are entitled
to these rights and benefits in the judicial proceedings of our state
courts generally: but it will by no means follow, that they will be en-
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Thus, two hundred years ago when the Bill of Rights was
enacted, the right to confrontation was viewed in conjunction
with the other procedural rights surrounding trial by jury.
Confrontation was part of an arsenal designed not only to en-
sure accurate results in criminal trials, but also to restrain the
government in criminal trials from acting in a covert, repug-
nant manner that would be concealed from the people.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RESTRAINTS ON INTERROGATION OF
WrrNESSES
If the premise of the previous section is correct-that the
concept of confrontation emerged as part of a package of com-
plementary procedural rights aimed at constraining
prosecutorial power-then the values the Supreme Court as-
cribes to the other procedural rights ought to be relevant in as-
sessing how the Confrontation Clause should function.114 This
section looks first at the Court's Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence to determine whether the need to restrain prosecutors
has affected the interpretation of any of the other provisions in
the Sixth Amendment.
At least two lines of cases suggest that the Court has recog-
nized the need to adopt special prophylactic rules when the
prosecution is in a position to orchestrate proceedings to shape
the evidence that the trial court will admit against a defendant.
In a series of cases commencing with Massiah v. United
States,1-5 the Supreme Court has interpreted the right to coun-
sel to apply when government agents interrogate an indicted
defendant, even though the right directly interferes with ascer-
taining the truth. In Massiah, the defendant thought that he
was speaking to a friend, rather than an agent for the prosecu-
tion, and had no incentive to lie.116 The dissent in Massiah ob-
titled to them in the federal courts, and have a right to assert them,
unless secured and established by the constitution or federal laws.
Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALI5T, supra
note 108, at 327-28; see also Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
ALIST, supra note 108, at 374-75.
114. Cf SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, § 51.03, at 467-97 (discussing concept
of in pari materia).
115. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
116. Massiah had retained counsel after being indicted and was out on bail
when a co-defendant approached him on a city street to discuss the case. Un-
[Vol. 76:557
PROSECUTORIAL RESTRAINT
jected to the establishment of:
a constitutional rule [that bars] the use of evidence which is relevant,
reliable and highly probative of the issue which the trial court has
before it-whether the accused committed the act with which he is
charged. Without the evidence, the quest for truth may be seriously
impeded and in many cases the trial court, although aware of proof
showing defendant's guilt, must nevertheless release him because the
crucial evidence is deemed inadmissible.11
7
The Massiah line of cases excludes reliable evidence produced
through prosecutorial interrogation if obtained in a manner
that impinges on a procedural right granted by the Sixth
Amendment. Because the restriction applies only when the
statements are "induced,"'1 8 these cases implicitly acknowledge
the dangerous ability of the government to shape evidence
through inquisition, and the inappropriateness of such behavior
in an accusatorial system of criminal procedure.
In several line-up cases commencing with United States v.
Wade,- 9 the Supreme Court also noted the need to devise a
procedure that would prevent the accused's fate from being de-
termined by the police's out-of-court activities rather than by
the jury. In Wade, the Court mandated excluding evidence of
an identification made at a line-up conducted in the absence of
defendant's counsel. The Court explained: "The trial which
might determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the
courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, with the State
aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the
accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or
unintentional."'2 0 The Court held the evidence must be ex-
cluded even when other existing evidence corroborates the ac-
curacy of the identification.
In Massiah and the line-up cases, the Court asserted that
right to counsel is absolute regardless of the reliability of the
accused's statement'2l or the witness's identification. In these
known to Massiah, the co-defendant had decided to cooperate with federal
agents, and had been equipped with a recording device. Id at 202-03. A major-
ity of the Supreme Court held that the defendant's damaging admissions
should be excluded because government agents deliberately elicited them from
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. Id at 206.
117. Ida at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456 (1986) (no violation of Massiah
when government informant functioned solely as listening post); cf United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980) (paid informer in same cellblock as
defendant was not a "passive listener").
119. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
120. Id. at 235.
121. In Massiah, the government filed a tape recording of the conversation
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situations the government agent is potentially affecting the evi-
dence at a "critical stage" of the prosecution. 2 2 The accused re-
ceives additional protection against interrogation because the
Fifth Amendment operates through Miranda to secure the
objectives of the Bill of Rights prior to the "critical" stage.M
In the case of witnesses, however, the Court has held that
right to counsel does not attach when the prosecution interro-
gates or otherwise obtains statements from witnesses prior to
trial, even after the initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings. 24 In 1973, the Court did not consider this stage critical
because it assumed that confrontation at trial will reveal the
details of the interrogation.1 25 Now that the Court views con-
frontation as serving solely a truth-serving function, however,
confrontation at trial is excused when the declarant's statement
satisfies a firmly rooted hearsay exception or possesses ade-
quate indicia of reliability. Far less protection is therefore af-
forded via the Confrontation Clause against statements elicited
by the prosecution than by Miranda and the right-to-counsel
cases, which provide absolute protection regardless of whether
the statement in question is relevant and reliable.1 2 6 This in-
consistency fails to acknowledge that the development of the
right to confrontation was inextricably interwoven with the
evolution of the other protections embodied in the Sixth and
Fifth Amendments, and that these constitutional guarantees
sought to achieve more than accurate fact-finding.'- 7
between accused and the co-defendant with the clerk of the Court, and argued
that the recording confirmed that no coercion had occurred. YALE KAMISAR
ET AL., MODERN CRmNAL PROCEDURE 431 n.b (7th ed., 1990).
122. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (right to counsel attaches
only after the initiation of adversary proceedings against the defendant).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (procedural safeguards re-
quired in connection with custodial interrogation).
124. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (refusing to extend Wade
right of counsel to government conducted post-indictment photographic dis-
play for the purpose of allowing witness to identify defendant).
125. In Ash, the Court surveyed a number of instances in which right to
counsel does not attach because the stage is not "critical." The Court ex-
plained that "the risks inherent in any confrontation [prior to trial between
the prosecutor and witness] still remain, but the opportunity to cure defects at
trial causes the confrontation to cease to be 'critical.'" 413 U.S. at 316. Both
the majority and Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion assumed that the
witness would testify at trial and would be cross-examined. Id. at 314, 325.
126. Cf Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3172 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissent-
ing) ("[Tmhe Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it
guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable
evidence.").
127. Comment, The Sixth Amendment as Constitutional Theory: Does
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B. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFRONTATION CASES
The Court did not address the Confrontation Clause until
the late nineteenth century, an understandable consequence of
the scant attention originally paid to the Bill of Rights and the
limited criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts early in the
nation's history. Interest in confrontation grew after 1965 due
to the enormously increased volume of cases to which the doc-
trine applies, 2 8 as well as the acceptance of Wigmore's theory
of confrontation as an evidentiary doctrine, an assumption that
came to have more and more significance as codification created
new hearsay exceptions.
1. The Confrontation Clause: The Early Cases
In 1895, the Court engaged in what was until the 1960s the
most extensive discussion of the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause. The Court's opinion in Mattox v. United States129 sup-
ports the conclusion that confrontation is an absolute right, and
that the objective of the provision was restraint of inquisitorial
questioning by the government.
The issue in Mattox was the admissibility of transcripts of
testimony that prosecution witnesses who had since died had
given at the defendant's prior trial. The defendant argued that
the admission of prior testimony transgressed the clear com-
mand of the Confrontation Clause. The Court disagreed, con-
cluding that former testimony was admissible because the
Confrontation Clause had been adopted subject to pre-existing
exceptions authorizing the receipt of evidence that did not sat-
isfy the literal command of confrontation. 30 One such excep-
Originalism Require That Massiah Be Abandoned?, J. CRim. L. & CRIMNOL-
OGY 423, 457 (1991). The Comment explains:
Along with the right to counsel, the sixth amendment guarantees an
accused the right to a speedy and public trial by jury, the right to no-
tices of charges, and the right to both confront and compel witnesses.
These protections, when considered in conjunction with the fifth
amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination, offer proof that
the ratifiers intended to establish a constitutionally mandated system
of criminal procedure that valued the rights of the accused and the
integrity of the prosecutorial system over the untrammelled pursuit
of truth.
Id- (citations omitted).
128. In that year the Court made the right to confrontation obligatory on
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 405 (1965).
129. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
130. Id. at 243. The Court stated:
We are bound to interpret the constitution in the light of the law as it
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tion was former testimony given at a prior proceeding at which
the defendant had the opportunity of "seeing the witness face
to face, and of subjecting him to cross examination.' 31
The Court discussed the contours of the former testimony
exception extensively, distinguishing the kinds of statements
deemed admissible from depositions and ex parte affidavits
which it determined were "the primary object" of the Confron-
tation Clause to exclude.132 Statements to a governmental
agent that were never subject to confrontation and cross-exami-
nation would thus clearly not satisfy constitutional require-
ments. That this point was obvious to the Court was
underscored by its comment about a South Carolina opinion:
"In the case of State v. Campbell ... the testimony of a de-
ceased witness had been taken before a coroner, but in the ab-
sence of the accused, and of course it was held to be
inadmissible. ' u s s
To bolster its argument that the Sixth Amendment was
adopted subject to pre-existing exceptions, the Court in dictum
discussed dying declarations as another antecedent exception in
addition to former testimony, stating: "[F]rom time irnmemo-
rial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no one
would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissi-
bility."' 4 The Court analyzed dying declarations solely in
existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new guar-
antees of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual
such as he already possessed as a British subject-such as his ances-
tom had inherited and defended since the days of Magna Carta. Many
of its provisions in the nature of a bill of rights are subject to excep-
tions, recognized long before the adoption of the constitution, and not
interfering at all with its spirit. Such exceptions were obviously in-
tended to be respected.
Id-
131. Id at 244. The Court apparently viewed cross-examination and con-
frontation as two separate requirements.
132. Id. at 242 ("The primary object of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes
admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal ex-
amination and cross-examination of the witness."); see Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
133. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 241. Compare Mattox with cases admitting grand
jury testimony discussed inkfra notes 215-18. In light of the aim of protecting
the defendant against the creator of the evidence it is also interesting to note
that the Court mentioned that many jurisdictions require not just the sub-
stance of the witness's testimony, "but the very words of the witness." 156
U.S. at 244. In Mattox the Court noted that the oath of the stenographer at-
testing to the accuracy of his notes supported his report. Id.
134. Id at 243.
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terms of reliability and need;ls it did not consider that the ex-
ception incorporates a confrontation rationale as it applies only
in homicide prosecutions when the defendant is charged with
the death of the declarant.136 Confrontation is excused when
the defendant causes the absence of the declarant.137
Consequently, with regard to the two pre-existing excep-
tions the Court mentioned, one is explicable on a waiver notion,
and the other requires confrontation at the time the declarant
makes a statement. The Court never suggested in Mattox that
subsequently created evidentiary rules authorizing the receipt
of out-of-court statements would satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.138 Indeed, in Motes v. United States,139 the first Justice
Harlan found a violation of the right to confrontation when the
preliminary examination of a witness whom the defendants had
cross-examined was introduced into evidence after the witness
disappeared due to the prosecution's negligence. The prosecu-
tion argued that such statements were admissible pursuant to
the rules of criminal evidence prevailing in the courts of the
state in which the defendant committed the crime, but the
Court disagreed on the ground that the question "must be de-
termined with reference to the rights of the accused as secured
by the Constitution of the United States."' 40 Neither Mattox
135. I& at 244.
136. On an earlier appeal, the Court assumed in Mattox that statements
under belief of impending death are admissible only in homicide prosecutions
when the defendant is charged with the death of the declarant. See Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892) (stating that the exception applies "on a
trial for murder"). While Wigmore insists that the limitation to homicide is a
misconstruction that commenced in 1803, in a footnote he quotes an 1802 ex-
cerpt from McNally in which the author limits dying declarations in a criminal
case to a "trial for murder." McNally does speak of admitting dying declara-
tions in civil cases but these, of course, do not implicate the Confrontation
Clause. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 62, at 162 n.2; see also FED. R. Evin. 804(b)(2)
(dying declarations limited to homicide cases and civil cases).
137. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879) ("[mlf a witness is
absent by [the defendant's] own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if
competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept
away.").
138. Cf 3 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 1397, at 101 ("There were a number of
well-established [hearsay exceptions] at the time of the earliest constitutions,
and others might be expected to be developed in the future.... The rule sanc-
tioned by the Constitution is the hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all
the exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed, or created
therein.").
139. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
140. I& at 474; see Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). In Kirby the
defendant was prosecuted for knowing possession of stolen property. Id at 48.
A judgment showing the conviction of three persons for stealing the goods was
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nor Motes so much as mention the word "hearsay."
2. The Influence of Wigmore
Commencing in 1899 with his revision of Greenleaf's Trea-
tise on Evidence, 141 and continuing through the three editions
of his own Treatise, 142 Wigmore laid the groundwork for the
Supreme Court's present view of confrontation as an eviden-
tiary doctrine. The influence of Wigmore, the effect of his the-
ory on the teaching of evidence, and the acceptance of his
theory by subsequent commentators and the courts have been
masterfully chronicled and critiqued and will not be repeated
here.' 43  Wigmore's thesis was stated above: evidence that
meets a hearsay exception also passes Confrontation Clause
muster because a hearsay exception guarantees that cross-ex-
amination is not needed, and the right of confrontation is iden-
tical with the right to cross-examination. Consequently the
admission of evidence that satisfies a hearsay exception does
not impair the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking mission,
which Wigmore assumes is the only function of the Confronta-
tion Clause.
3. The Confrontation Clause Cases: 1965 to Present
If one looks at what the Supreme Court has said since 1965,
it appears that Wigmore's vision of the Confrontation Clause
has triumphed in large measure. The Court has identified the
Confrontation Clause's mission as the ascertainment of truth'"
and has endorsed the similarity, if not equivalency, of Confron-
introduced into evidence against defendant pursuant to statute for the purpose
of proving that the goods were stolen; introduction of record of conviction vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause. Id The Court stated that it could not permit
proof by record,
without conceding the power of the legislature, when prescribing the
effect as evidence of the records and proceedings of courts, to impair
the very substance of a right long deemed so essential for the due pro-
tection of life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and ju-
dicial action by provisions in the constitution of the United States and
in the constitutions of most if, not of all, the states composing the
Union.
Id at 56.
141. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1899).
142. The three editions were published in 1904, 1923, and 1939. See WIG-
MORE, supra note 62.
143. See Gutman, supra note 16, at 327-43; see also Graham, supra note 59,
at 104; Larkin, supra note 22, at 68-70.
144. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-90 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
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tation Clause and hearsay values.' 45 Although it has not ac-
cepted Wigmore's view that newly created hearsay exceptions
will automatically satisfy the constitutional provision,146 it has
rejected any interpretation of the Clause that would treat con-
frontation as an absolute right subject only to the exceptions
recognized at common law prior to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. 47
Interestingly, since the Court decides which cases it wishes
to hear, its Confrontation Clause docket has dealt almost exclu-
sively with out-of-court statements that the government or an
agent working for the prosecution elicited, rather than state-
ments made to non-officials.'48 This suggests that the Court is
aware of the special dangers posed by the government's partici-
pation in the creation of evidence. In its opinions, however, the
Court has only tangentially recognized the prosecution's special
role in gathering the evidence in question, even though, as will
be discussed below, some of the opinions reach results and con-
tain language compatible with a prosecutorial restraint
model.' 49
The discussion that follows considers the extent to which
the Court has been sensitive to the potential for inquisitorial
questioning in three categories of cases: first, cases in which
the statements do not satisfy the Court's test for former testi-
mony, and no other exception applies; second, cases in which
the statement was not subjected to contemporaneous cross-ex-
amination and confrontation, but the declarant is produced; and
third, cases in which the statement satisfies a hearsay excep-
tion, and the declarant is not produced. It then evaluates the
standards the Court has set forth and concludes that they fail
145. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990).
146. I at 3148 ("[W]ere we to agree that the admission of hearsay state-
ments under the residual exception automatically passed Confrontation Clause
scrutiny, virtually every codified hearsay exception would assume constitu-
tional stature, a step this Court has repeatedly declined to take.").
147. See Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987); Dutton v. Ev-
ans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-96 (Harlan, J. concurring).
148. Cf. Boujaily, 483 U.S. at 173-74 (statement made to informant work-
ing for the FBI, discussed infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text). The ex-
ceptions are Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 77 (statement made to a fellow
prisoner) and United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 389 (1986) (statement made
to co-conspirator). In Illinois v. White, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), five different out-
of-court statements were admitted, one of which was made to a police officer.
Id at 739.
149. See infra part I.
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to restrain prosecutors adequately in the second and third cate-
gories of cases.
a. No Hearsay Exception
Not until after 1970 did the Court begin a vigorous explora-
tion of the relationship between statements that satisfy hearsay
exceptions and the Confrontation Clause. Until then, the
Court's confrontation cases involved former testimony, or state-
ments that did not satisfy any hearsay exception. In these cases
the Court found a Sixth Amendment violation when a govern-
ment attorney obtained the statement in issue at a hearing or
as a consequence of government interrogation, unless an oppor-
tunity for confrontation and cross-examination existed either at
the time the statement was given or at trial..'s ° Furthermore,
the Court extended the notion of prosecutorial misbehavior or
negligence to situations in which the prosecution did not make
an adequate effort to produce the declarant. 151
The result in this line of cases is consistent with a rationale
of requiring the government to present its case in public. The
prosecutor cannot rely on secretly created evidence to make out
a case at trial even if the declarant becomes unavailable. State-
ments the prosecutor obtained are admissible if the declarant
becomes unavailable only when the prosecutor is not responsi-
ble for the declarant's unavailability and the statement was
previously subject to cross-examination, a provision that en-
sures an opportunity to explore the prosecutor's role in bring-
ing about the statement.
b. Declarant Produced
The second category consists of cases in which the person
who previously made a statement to the government is present
150. Cases in which the statements do not satisfy the former testimony ex-
ception and cases implicating Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), fall
into this category: Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416-17 (1965) (accom-
plice's written confession made during interrogation); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 401 (1965) (testimony of witness given at preliminary hearing at
which defendant was unrepresented by counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.
1, 2 (1965) (custodial confession of accomplice).
151. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); see also Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75-77, 79-80 (1980) (majority and dissent disagreed as to
prosecution's effort); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 210-12 (1972) (state was
powerless to compel declarant's attendance); cf Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363, 363-64 (1966) (per curiam) (bailiff who made comments to sequestered
jury about defendant's guilt in effect became witness against defendant in vio-
lation of defendant's confrontation right).
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and testifying at trial, and the prior statement is introduced as
substantive evidence. 152 In United States v. Owens,153 a five-to-
four majority of the Court held that constitutional require-
ments are satisfied whenever the hearsay declarant is produced
at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. In
Owens, the declarant, Foster, had suffered a severe head injury
as the result of an attack the defendant allegedly committed.
While Foster was in the hospital, an FBI agent interviewed him
and reported that Foster identified the defendant as his assail-
ant. Although Foster later remembered stating that Owens
had assaulted him, he did not remember anything about the at-
tack and did not remember any of his hospital visitors-includ-
ing his wife who came daily. He remembered seeing only the
agent to whom he made the identification.'- 4
Neither the majority nor the dissent, which disagreed
about the effectiveness of cross-examination under these cir-
cumstances, considered whether Foster's statement should have
been excluded to deter prosecutorial overreaching. Some safe-
guard should be required when a government agent deliber-
ately induces a statement from a witness known to be suffering
from a disability, such as a severe head injury. Although the
government produced the declarant, he was incapable of recon-
structing the interview that led him to make the identifica-
tion. 5 5 The defendant was, of course, at liberty to ask the
agent about the interrogation, and the jury could have decided
to disbelieve him. But the problem is not just that of ascertain-
ing the truth; the questioning of incapacitated witnesses entails
the same kind of dangers that underlie the Massiah and Wade
line of cases discussed above and should be handled with a pro-
phylactic rule responsive to the danger.
c. Hearsay Exception: Declarant Not Produced
The third category, most reflective of Wigmore's influence,
152. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court reserved decision
on whether a declarant's lack of memory about the events detailed in the
statement might so affect the defendant's ability to cross-examine as to
amount to a denial of confrontation. Id. at 168-70. Although the Green Court
characterized Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), as preventing depo-
sitions or ex parte affidavits, the Court still viewed the rationale for confronta-
tion solely in terms of enabling the jury to ascertain the truth. I& at 157-58.
153. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
154. Id at 556.
155. Safeguards with regard to the questioning of children are discussed in-
fra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
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consists of cases in which a court admits the evidence in ques-
tion pursuant to a hearsay exception, and the declarant did not
testify at trial. In some of these cases the witness was unavaila-
ble; in others the witness was not. To date, the Supreme Court
has treated statements made to prosecutors or their agents pur-
suant to three different hearsay exceptions: co-conspirators'
statements, declarations against interest, and the residual hear-
say exception.
(i). Co-conspirators Statements
The text of the applicable rule does not appear to implicate
prosecutors at all.'ls In order for a co-conspirator's statement
to be admitted, "[t]here must be evidence that there was a con-
spiracy involving the declarant and the nonoffering party, and
that the statement was made 'in the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.' ,,157 According to the Supreme Court, fulfill-
ment of the evidentiary rule simultaneously satisfies the consti-
tutional test, so that a nontestifying co-conspirator's statement
is admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness.158
In Bouzjaily v. United States,159 none of the justices in the
majority or in the dissent considered it significant that the
statement was made in a telephone conversation with an in-
formant working for the FBI. The Court ignored the issue of
whether a special analysis is required when statements are ob-
tained by a governmental agent or an informant working for an
agent. In an earlier case, the Court had said that when a con-
spirator speaks to a fellow conspirator, the resulting statement
may indeed have significant evidentiary value because
"[c]onspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to
each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testi-
fying on the witness stand. '160 When a government agent elic-
its the statement with a possible agenda as to the answers he
wants, the spontaneity of the responses is much less convincing.
In some instances, the agent's questions may be deliberately
framed to encourage certain replies. The failure to produce the
156. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "A statement is not hearsay if
... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a cocon-
spirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
157. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
158. I& at 182; United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398-400 (1985).
159. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
160. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395.
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declarant means that secret questioning is immunized from
jury scrutiny.
If an object of confrontation is to require the prosecution to
make visible the manner in which it creates evidence, then the
Court's current interpretation of the co-conspirators' exception
is totally insensitive to this goal. Although the Court in
Boujaily justified the constitutional status of the exception on
the basis of its long, firmly rooted existence, the declarants in
the cases the Court cited were not making statements to agents
of the prosecution.161 The contrary is true in the majority of
the cases that currently reach the federal appellate courts. It is
possible to determine to whom the declarant was speaking in
forty-two officially reported appellate opinions that in 1990 ad-
dressed co-conspirators' statements. 62 In seventeen of these
cases the declarant was speaking to an undercover agent163 and
161. The Court cited the following cases in Bouijaily in support of the con-
clusion that co-conspirators' statements are firmly rooted: United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (tapes at issue contained mostly conversations in
which at least one of the co-conspirators participated); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (testimony of inmates regarding statements made by
a codefendant concerning defendant's involvement in a murder allowed); Dela-
ney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586 (1924) (co-conspirator's testimony regarding
details relayed by a conspirator who was dead at the time of trial allowed);
United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 460 (1827) (Court allowed testi-
mony by ship captain to whom ship's master had offered position regarding
the ownership of a slave ship). Bouiiailly, 483 U.S. at 182-83.
162. By cases dealing with co-conspirators statements, I mean all cases in
which issues arising under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) were raised
on appeal. In three cases, it was not possible to tell to whom the declarant was
speaking United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Meggers, 912 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d
1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
163. United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States
v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911
F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 801 (1991); United States v.
Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990); United
States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Schmick, 904
F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 782 (1991); United States v. Pal-
lais, 921 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 134 (1991); United
States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1078 (1991);
United States v. Felton, 908 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Arvanitis,
902 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1991); United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1990), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1087 (1991); United States v. Byrom, 910 F.2d 725 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534 (l1th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 523 (1991);
cfi United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1990) (undercover agent over-
heard declarant), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 709 (1991).
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in another seven cases the declarant was speaking to an inform-
ant.16 In only sixteen cases was the declarant speaking to a
true co-conspirator.165
The overwhelming majority of the 1990 appellate cases in-
volving the conspirator's exception result from narcotics
charges. 16 Because the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
164. United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2011 (1991);
United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 173 (1990); United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1990) cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 971 (1991) and cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2240 (1991); United
States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 918
F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vasquez, 903 F.2d 1400 (l1th Cir.
1990) (per curiam).
165. United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2057 (1991); United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d
435 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1402 (1991); United States v.
Elizondo, 920 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nichols, 910 F.2d 419
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 909 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1990), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 691 (1991); United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 69 (1990); United States v. Mayberry, 896 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir.
1990); United States v. Drew, 894 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct.
1830 (1990); United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Torres, 908 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 272 and cer, denied,
111 S. Ct. 366 (1990); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2274 (1991); United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 761 (1991); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501 (lth Cir.
1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 151 (1991) and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 253 (1991);
United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1681 (1991).
166. In 34 out of the 47 opinions, the statements were made in drug prose-
cutions: United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam);
United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 801 (1991);
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
2011 (1991); United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied,
111 S. Ct. 709 (1991); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2057 (1991); United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399 (6th Cir.
1990); United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 112 S.
Ct. 134 (1991); United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1078 (1991);
United States v. Nichols, 910 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Felton,
908 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d
1064 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 124 (1990); United States v. Briscoe, 896
F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990); United States v. Hoel-
scher, 914 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 971 and cert denied,
111 S. Ct. 2240 (1991); United States v. Meggers, 912 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith,
909 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 691 (1991); United States v.
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jurisprudence awards constitutionality to every co-conspirator's
statement that satisfies the evidentiary test,167 the process by
which the prosecution gathers evidence in these cases may re-
main shrouded in secrecy. Obviously, effective crime enforce-
ment requires some clandestine governmental activity, but the
law has recognized, even apart from constitutional concerns,
that there are limits on what the prosecution may do in the
name of efficiency or avoiding harm to its agents. For instance,
if the prosecution oversteps certain bounds, the defendant may
be able to establish entrapment. 6 If a secret informant's testi-
mony is necessary to a fair determination of defendant's guilt
or innocence, the government has to choose between revealing
the informant's identity or having the case dismissed. 69
The inability to obtain a total, two-sided picture of the pro-
cess by which governmental agents have obtained incriminating
statements against targeted individuals is somewhat philosoph-
ically at odds with these doctrines. Furthermore, the more ju-
rors are kept in the dark about the government's role in
shaping the evidence, the less able they are to exercise their
power to acquit in extreme cases because of a distaste for the
methods used by law-enforcement authorities. Even if jury
nullification is not recognized in theory, in practice the jury's
ability to acquit may play a role in curtailing undesirable prac-
tices.170 Recent narcotics prosecutions in which jurors refused
O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 352 (1990); United
States v. Nevils, 897 F.2d 300 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 125 (1990);
United States v. Drew, 894 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1830
(1990); United States v. Torres, 908 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
272 and cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 366 (1990); United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1990), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1087 (1991); United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 761 (1990); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S.
Ct. 151 and cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 253 (1990); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d
1552 (l1th Cir. 1990); United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1681 (1991); United States v. Byrom, 910 F.2d 725 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948 (11th Cir. 1990).
167. See supra text accompanying note 158.
168. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988) (permitting
defendant to raise an entrapment defense even if he denies commission of
crime provided "there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find entrapment.").
169. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
170. See Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group Wants Juries to Follow Natural
Law, N.Y. TDMEs, Sept. 26, 1991, at B16 (discussing growth of movement aimed
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to convict i71 suggest that the jury's access to information about
the prosecution affects the right to trial by jury, and that an in-
terpretation of the Confrontation Clause that makes more in-
formation accessible to the jury may consequently have an
impact on how the jury functions.
(ii). Statements Against Interest
The statement against interest hearsay exception is simi-
larly silent about statements made to the government.172 With
regard to this type of hearsay, however, the Court has demon-
strated some interest in the prosecution's role in securing evi-
dence. In Lee v. Illinois, 73 the trial court had "expressly relied
on portions of the codefendant's confession, obtained by police
at time of arrest, as substantive evidence against the peti-
tioner.1 74 In a five-to-four decision, both the majority and dis-
sent assumed that the statement could be classified as a
statement against penal interest.175 The majority, however,
treated the evidentiary classification of the statement as incon-
sequential. It characterized the hearsay exception as defining
"too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis
,. . [and] decide[d] this case as involving a confession by an ac-
complice which incriminates a criminal defendant.' 76 In
reaching this conclusion, the five justices rejected Wigmore's
hypothesis that statements that pass the evidentiary hurdle of
at allowing juries to nullify bad laws). The question of whether there should
be jury nullification is certainly beyond the scope of this Article.
171. Id. at B16. Bishop discusses jury rebellion in recent cases such as the
prosecutions of automobile manufacturer John DeLorean and Mayor Marion
Barry of Washington, D.C. because of distaste for the prosecution's undercover
tactics. Id
172. FED. R. EvD. 804(b)(3). It admits "[a] statement which... at the time
of its making ... so far tended to subject the declarant to... criminal liability,
... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made
the statement unless believing it to be true." Id
173. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
174. Id at 531.
175. The cedefendant's confession was not formerly offered pursuant to a
hearsay exception at trial. The two defendants were tried together in a bench
trial, and the court indicated that it would consider only the evidence proper
to each defendant with regard to that defendant. Id at 536. Before the
Supreme Court, the State of Illinois contended that the hearsay involved was a
declaration against penal interest. Id at 544 n.5. The dissent found that the
statements "were thoroughly and unambiguously adverse to [the declarant's]
penal interest" and concluded that they meet the requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause because declarations against penal interest are firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions. Id. at 551 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Id at 544 n.5.
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the hearsay rule will automatically satisfy the Confrontation
Clause.177
The majority, nevertheless, in finding a constitutional vio-
lation, relied on an evidentiary concern, the fear that "the ad-
mission of this type of evidence will distort the truthfinding
process."'178 There are glimmers in the majority opinion, how-
ever, that support a construction of the Confrontation Clause as
requiring more than accurate determinations. Before launching
into its demonstration of the "inherently unreliable" features
of a codefendant's confession inculpating the accused, 79 the
majority considered how the constitutional provision serves
symbolic goals:
On one level, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice
in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails. To
foster such a system, the Constitution provides certain safeguards to
promote to the greatest possible degree society's interest in having the
accused and accuser engage in an open and even contest in a public
trial. The Confrontation Clause advances these goals by ensuring that
convictions will not be based on the charges of unseen and un-
known--and hence unchallengeable-individuals. 180
Although the majority's opinion concentrated almost exclu-
sively on the declarant and his motive to falsify, the majority
also noted that "[t]he unsworn statement was given in response
to the questions of police, who, having already interrogated
Lee, no doubt knew what they were looking for, and the state-
ment was not tested in any manner by contemporaneous cross-
examination by counsel, or its equivalent.' 181
Taken together, the majority's recognition that the Clause
complements the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by
jury and its acknowledgment that the prosecutor may have an
agenda before questioning begins provide support for the thesis
being put forward in this Article. Inculpatory confessions elic-
ited through a custodial interrogation closely resemble the
177. Id. at 543.
178. Id- at 544. The majority explained-
The true danger inherent in this type of hearsay is, in fact, its selec-
tive reliability. As we have consistently recognized, a codefendant's
confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the
defendant's conduct or culpability because those passages may well be
the product of the codefendant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry
favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another.
I& at 545.
179. 1id at 546.
180. I& at 540.
181. Id at 544.
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kinds of statements that historically led to a demand for con-
frontation. Public scrutiny of the declarant is necessary not
only to probe his motives for having made the statement incul-
pating the accused, but also to explore the extent to which the
prosecution's expectations may have shaped the statement's
wording and scope, and to check whether the prosecution
brought pressures or promises to bear. The knowledge that the
prosecution's behavior will be explored at trial may also deter
suggestive and leading inquisitorial practices.
(iii) Residual Hearsay Exception
In Idaho v. Wright,:1 2 the state trial court had admitted
statements a two-and-a-half-year-old child, Kathy, made to a
physician, Dr. Jambura, in which she accused her father of sex-
ual abuse. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that the admis-
sion of the statements, pursuant to the state's residual hearsay
exception,18 3 violated the defendant's rights under the Confron-
tation Clause.18 The United States Supreme Court, in another
five-to-four opinion, agreed.
Because the child's statements did not satisfy a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, all members of the Court agreed that
they were presumptively unreliable and inadmissible absent a
182. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
183. The statements were admitted pursuant to an Idaho rule which is
identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: Other exceptions. A statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admit-
ted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to pro-
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
[the proponent's] intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
IDAHO R. EviD. 803(24) (cited at 110 S. Ct. at 3144-45).
184. In the originial trial both the mother and father were defendants. 110
S. Ct. at 3143. In separate appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction of the father, State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1989), but reversed the
conviction of the mother, State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224 (Idaho 1989). The ba-
sis of the distinction was that the father did not raise the Confrontation Clause
issue on appeal. 110 S. Ct. at 3145.
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showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 1s 5
After viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
questioning of Kathy by Dr. Jambura, the majority found that
the Supreme Court of Idaho "properly focused on the sugges-
tive manner" in which the doctor conducted the interview.lss
According to the Idaho court, Dr. Jambura asked blatantly
leading questions in the interrogation and began the interview
with a preconceived notion of what Kathy should disclose.18 7
Consequently, the Idaho Supreme Court majority detected "no
special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements
were particularly trustworthy."' ss
In its discussion, the majority did not explicitly accord any
significance to the role the prosecution played in obtaining
Kathy's statements. In fact, Kathy made the statements to Dr.
Jambura after she had been in police custody overnight. Police
selected the physician and the doctor knew that officers sus-
pected the child had been sexually abused by her father.,1 9
The doctor therefore prepared four questions for Kathy's inter-
view that focused exclusively on the child's activities with her
father. In using leading questions to get for the police "what
they were looking for,"'190 Dr. Jambura functioned as an agent
of the prosecution.191
185. 110 S. Ct. at 3146-47; see also id. at 3153 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id at 3152.
187. Id at 3145.
188. Id. at 3152.
189. The previous day the police had sent Kathy's older half-sister to Dr.
Jambura for an examination after she complained that she was being sexually
abused by her mother and her mother's boyfriend, Kathy's father. When Dr.
Jambura's examination of Kathy's sister revealed evidence of sexual abuse,
the police took Kathy into custody. Id. at 3143.
190. See discussion of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), in text accompa-
nying supra note 181.
191. In his commentary to this Article, Professor Jonakait objects that the
record in Idaho v. Wright does not support the conclusion that Dr. Jambura
was acting as an agent of the prosecution. Jonakait, supra note 29, at 619. To
my surprise, I found support for my position in an unexpected quarter. The
Solicitor General filed a brief in White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), in
which he argued that only statements taken by the government with a view to
legal proceedings are subject to Confrontation Clause analysis because only
then are the declarants in the position of "witnesses against" the defendant.
According to this analysis, with which I do not agree, see text accompanying
supra notes 28-29, statements such as the excited utterances in the White case
do not have to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The Solicitor General con-
ceded, however, that the child's statements in Idaho v. Wright are statements
to which the Confrontation Clause applies:
[Tjhe questioning in that case occurred after the declarant had been
taken into custody by the police, and the state court's characterization
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Although the majority did not comment on Dr. Jambura's
connection with the police, the opinion suggests that the prose-
cution's role in creating evidence may have had an unarticu-
lated impact. The majority and the dissent disagreed
principally about the evidence a court may consider in deter-
mining whether "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
are shown. The dissent argued strongly that other evidence
that confirmed the truth of the statement, such as physical evi-
dence of sexual abuse, should be usable to corroborate the reli-
ability of the statement.192 According to the majority, however,
the relevant circumstances that may be considered "include
only those that surround the making of the statement and that
render the declarant particularly worthy of belief."'193
Limiting evidence to the truthfulness of the declarant
rather than the truth of the statement in question may strike
many besides the dissenters as contrary to the common sense
we use in evaluating hearsay in everyday life. It may also seem
somewhat at odds with the goal of more accurate fact determi-
nations.194 The majority's test makes perfect sense, however, in
terms of restraining the prosecution. The result is that prose-
cutors cannot bolster weak evidence that would be insufficient
to support a verdict by leaning on a witness to produce a state-
ment that a court would then find sufficiently trustworthy to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause because it is corroborated by
the original evidence. Such an opportunity to bootstrap, which
the majority rejects, would give the prosecution an incentive to
prop up unsubstantial evidence with hearsay statements ob-
of the questioning suggest that it was designed to develop evidence in
a criminal case.... The questioning therefore may be regarded as
functionally equivalent to other forms of official interrogation that re-
sult in statements by a "witness."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28
n.18, White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) (citations omitted). Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion in White proposes a considerably narrower
formula for identifying extrajudicial statements subject to the Confrontation
Clause. See supra notes 25-30. Kathy's statements in response to Dr. Jambura
would presumably not meet Justice Thomas's definition.
192. 110 S. Ct. at 3156 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 3148.
194. See Ronald J. Allen, Foreword-Evidence, Inference, Rules and Judg-
ment in Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing Case of Walton v. Ari-
zona, 81 S. CT. REV. 727, 753-55 (1991). Allen points out the weakness in the
Wright Court's analysis: "One important determinant of reliability is the
manner in which any particular testimony meshes with other testimony, as
well as with what the decision maker believes to be reasonable. These are not
matters that can be limited to the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement." Id. at 754.
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tained through inquisitorial questioning. The majority's opin-
ion, though couched in terms of reliability and trustworthiness,
restrains a prosecutor from attempting to shape the evidence
during an interview controlled by an interrogator who induces
a statement from a declarant who will be conveniently absent
at trial.
After looking at these recent Confrontation Clause cases, it
appears that the objective of limiting the prosecution and ex-
posing its workings to the jury may have affected decisions
even while the Court was acknowledging its allegiance to accu-
racy in fact-finding. At best, however, the Court's recognition
of a goal of limiting the government is erratic and is completely
ignored in the case of the co-conspirator's exception. Further-
more, the majorities that crafted opinions in Lee and Wright,
which are supportive of a prosecutorial restraint rationale, in-
clude now retired Justices Brennan and Marshall. Given the
crime-control model of criminal justice that increasingly has
found favor with conservative justices, it is unlikely that recent
appointees to the Court will be interested in a theory that seeks
to make more public the exercise of the prosecutorial function.
Nevertheless, the final section of this Article will attempt to
demonstrate why such an approach is needed. Since all but
three state constitutions contain some version of a confronta-
tion clause, 9 5 perhaps state courts may evince more interest in
construing the clauses in their own constitutions as a limitation
on the government's power to create and use evidence.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A. THE TRUSTWORTHINESS RATIONALE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
MEANINGFUL PROTECTION
Others have so ably demonstrated the illusory protection
afforded a defendant by the evidentiary version of confronta-
tion 9 6 that there is little need for further comment. The prob-
lem has been exacerbated by the growing erosion of the
hearsay rule. If hearsay statements are being judicially ana-
195. Cf Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform:
Toward a Three Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REv. 623, 640
n.71 (1992) (citing LEGISLATrVE DRAFrNG REsEARCH FuND, CoNsTrrUrONS OF
THE UNITED STATEs, NATIONAL AND STATEs (1991) (collecting State Constitu-
tional provisions).
196. Immwinkelreid, supra note 2, at 522-38.
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lyzed to by-pass notions of trustworthiness 97 and confrontation
is measured by the parameters of the hearsay rule, then neither
the evidentiary rule nor the constitutional doctrine will safe-
guard the accused.
Furthermore, the accused lacks protection even when satis-
faction of the hearsay requirement does not automatically sat-
isfy the Confrontation Clause, as is the case with hearsay
admitted pursuant to a residual exception.198 Indicia of reliabil-
ity are "easy to come by."' Indeed, one part of the majority
opinion in Idaho v. Wright2° ° reads like a handbook instructing
prosecutors how to offer a child's hearsay statement with requi-
site "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." According
to the Court, the following factors bear on whether a statement
by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases is reliable: spon-
taneity and constant repetition; mental state of the declarant;
use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; lack of
motive to fabricate.201 Exactly what do the factors on this list
prove? For instance, use of terminology unexpected of a child
of similar age does not establish the trustworthiness of the
child in question unless there is a basis for ascertaining that
this particular child would not have heard these words
elsewhere. 202
197. Eleanor Swift, Has the Hearsay Rule Been Abolished De Facto by Judi-
cial Decision?, 76 MIN. L. REV. 473 (1992).
198. Of course legislatures may react by creating new class exceptions that
over time may be viewed as firmly rooted, and ergo, constitutional. Courts
may also reclassify statements as fitting into a class exception; for example,
statements by an alleged victim of child sexual abuse to a physician identifying
the defendant have been admitted by some courts pursuant to Federal Rules
of Evidence 803(t). See, e.g., United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 177 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 859 (1989); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430,
437 (8th Cir. 1985). Whether the Supreme Court will consider a pre-codifica-
tion, but reformulated, exception as firmly rooted remains to be seen. The
same issue arises with regard to declarations against interest, as declarations
against penal interest had not been admissible prior to their inclusion in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that statements that satisfy Rule 804(b)(3) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are firmly rooted hearsay exceptions).
199. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 110 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
201. Id. at 3150.
202. A presumption that young children would not know the facts of life
unless they were sexually abused seems suspect in an era when 70% of all
American households own VCRs, video stores have large sections devoted to
"adult" movies, a market exists in home-made pornographic films, N.Y. TmEs,
Mar. 22, 1991 at A14, children enter day care at very young ages, and baby sit-
ters are often relied on for child care. Under these circumstances, even a par-
ent may not be aware of what a child has seen and heard.
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Judges are unlikely to spend time on evidentiary hearings
aimed at establishing the parameters of the particular child's
knowledge. 203 Rather, experience with the co-conspirators ex-
ception suggests that judges will admit a statement if the prose-
cutor recites the appropriate formula. Although a statement
satisfies the co-conspirators exception only if made "in further-
ance" of the conspiracy, the cases indicate that courts may fail
to consider whether the statement really tended to advance the
objectives of the conspiracy. Instead, the provision is often con-
strued mechanically to authorize admission whenever the state-
ment can be characterized as falling into certain categories the
appellate courts have developed.2°4
B. APPLYING A PROSECUTORIAL RESTRAINT MODEL
Under a prosecutorial restraint model, statements elicited
by the prosecution and admissible pursuant to hearsay excep-
tions would have to be reanalyzed to determine conformity
with the Confrontation Clause. Suggestions for how this in-
quiry should be conducted follow.
1. Former Testimony
The current rules regarding the admission of prior testi-
mony have remained virtually the same since the original
Supreme Court opinions construing the Confrontation
Clause.20 5 They are consistent with a prosecutorial restraint
rationale.206
2. Declarant Produced
Ordinarily the objectives served by the Confrontation
203. In addition, such a hearing might be fruitless. Kathy, the two-and-
one-half-year-old child in Wright, was excused from testifying because of her
inability to answer simple questions. When asked how old she was, for exam-
ple, she first responded, "Kathy Wright" and then stated she was six years old.
Joint Appendix at 33-34, Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
204. For a summary of some of the categories frequently utilized by the
courts, see United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 958-59 (2d Cir.
1990) ("[S]tatements between coconspirators that may be found to be in fur-
therance of the conspiracy include statements that provide reassurance, or
seek to induce a coconspirator's assistance, or serve to foster trust and cohe-
siveness, or inform each other as to the progress or status of the conspiracy."),
cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 2811 (1991).
205. See suprm part H.B.1.
206. The efficacy of the restraint will be lessened to the extent that the




Clause will be satisfied if the declarant testifies at trial and his
out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence. If, however,
the declarant was known to be particularly vulnerable2°7 when
the prosecution deliberately obtained his statement, then the
prosecution should be required to produce a tape of the inter-
view unless the statement was obtained at a hearing at which a
transcript was made.208 This requirement will not only deter
prosecutors from leaning on the witness, but will also enable
the jury to reconstruct the interview. In the absence of a tape,
the witness relating the statement rather than the jury is likely
to control the outcome.209
3. Co-conspirator's Statements
Statements deliberately elicited by an agent of the prosecu-
tion should not automatically satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
When the interrogator is relying on leading questions, or is
otherwise making suggestions with a preconceived notion of the
evidence he wishes to obtain, the declarant ought to be pro-
duced. On the other hand, if the agent or informant is playing
a passive, non-directive role, the statement does not resemble
the product of inquisitorial questioning. Courts should have
discretion to determine which mode of interrogation the agent
employed. To do so, of course, they have to examine the state-
ment in the context in which it arose. Frequently, this will not
be a problem because the government regularly wires agents
and informants.210 Co-conspirators' statements made to an
207. A mentally unstable person, or a child, or someone suffering from a
head injury as in United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), are examples of
vulnerability. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
208. In the federal courts a transcript will always exist if the statement is
being offered as a prior inconsistent statement. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A). This is not so in some states, such as California. See California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 149 (1969).
209. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussion of United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)).
210. In the 34 drug prosecutions that resulted in reported appellate review
in 1990, tapes of the co-conspirators' statements were produced in half. See
United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Fel-
ton, 908 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d
629 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 684 (1991); United States v. Sophie,
900 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 124 (1990); United States v.
Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990), United
States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 971
(1991); United States v. Meggers, 912 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Smith, 909 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 691 (1991), United
States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d
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agent or informant should be presumptively excluded unless
the government produces the declarant, or unless the govern-
ment demonstrates through a recording the non-suggestive na-
ture of the questioning. This prophylactic device will also deter
prosecutorial abuse and enhance the jury's ability to function.
If the declarant is unavailable due to death, the prosecution
should be given the benefit of the doubt in a border line case of
suggestibility since the prosecution has been deprived of the op-
portunity of producing the declarant. The need for confronta-
tion is waived if the defendant caused the death or
disappearance of the declarant. 211
4. Declarations Against Interest
Statements induced as a consequence of custodial interro-
gation are markedly like the statements that produced the orig-
inal demands for confrontation.2' 2  The potential for
prosecutorial overreaching in this situation mandates a per se
rule of exclusion as has been adopted in some of the circuits.213
Courts should look at the context of non-custodial statements
to prosecutors to see whether they were spontaneous or the
product of a premeditated prosecutorial approach. Statements
that were elicited through a planned interview should be ex-
cluded. Interviews of this type are particularly dangerous be-
cause the prosecutorial agent may be well aware that the
declarant will never testify because he is involved in the crimi-
nal activities being investigated, and will claim the privilege
against self-incrimination regardless of whether or not he is ul-
timately indicted.2 14
457 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1087 (1991); United States v. Smith,
918 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 151 (1991); United States
v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Byrom, 910 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Vasquez, 903 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Khoury, 901
F.2d 948 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 910 F.2d 713 (1990);
United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
211. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
212. Cobham's statements implicating Raleigh can be analyzed as declara-
tions against interest. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1104 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982).
214. See United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1991) (admit-
ting as declarations against penal interest statements obtained by Secret Ser-
vice agent in what appears to be third interview of the day; since court held




5. Residual Hearsay Exception
a. Grand Jury Testimony
A growing number of circuits have been admitting grand
jury testimony by a now-unavailable declarant pursuant to the
residual hearsay exception.215 This result is clearly incompati-
ble with a prosecutorial restraint interpretation of the Confron-
tation Clause. These statements are elicited, and often
prepared, by the prosecutor.216 It is difficult to imagine why
the statement of Cobham put before a grand jury would differ
significantly in content from the accusation he made against Sir
Walter Raleigh. The prosecutor has an incentive to lean on the
prospective witness to shape the grand jury testimony in ac-
cordance with the prosecution's theory of the case in order to
secure an indictment and to freeze the witness's story as much
as possible. If the declarant does not appear at trial, the prose-
cutor's role as ghostwriter will not be easily discernible. In ad-
dition, allowing the grand jury testimony to be used at trial
encourages prosecutors to overreach in another way:
[A] rule allowing the government to replace the live testimony of key
witnesses with prior grand jury or other extra-judicial statements cre-
ates a powerful incentive for prosecutors to acquiesce in, or even plan,
the unavailability of witnesses in order to prevent live confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses in the courtroom. It is much eas-
ier to plan a trial and convince a jury of a contested set of facts if the
jury hears only the direct testimony from one side.2 1 7
If the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial before
a jury is to be meaningful, then secretly prepared grand jury
testimony must be excluded unless the defendant has made the
215. United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
936 (1978); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977). But see i fra note 217.
216. See, e.g. United States v. Guinan, 836 F.2d 350, 357-58 (7th Cir.) (grand
jury testimony of estranged wife who had contacted IRS was admitted; IRS
agent had written statement which wife read verbatim before grand jury),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2871 (1988).
217. United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 1991). The
Gomez-Lemos court held that the Confrontation Clause barred grand jury tes-
timony because Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), means that courts may
no longer look to corroborating evidence as to the truth of the statement to
establish "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. at 332. Although
he agreed with majority that Confrontation Clause should bar testimony,
Judge Nelson, concurring, suggested that grand jury testimony in question
might be sufficiently trustworthy to gain admission in light of other decisions
in circuit. Id. at 335 (Nelson, J. concurring). He would support application for
rehearing en banc. Id. at 336.
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grand jury witness unavailable2 1 8 or, perhaps, the witness unex-
pectedly dies. In the latter situation, the prosecution might not
be required to bear the loss of evidence that cannot be repli-
cated and which it obtained in the ordinary process of prepar-
ing a criminal case.
b. Child's Statement
The Wright case illustrates how an interviewer with an
agenda can manipulate a child.2 19 Even if the government sub-
sequently produces the child as a witness, the jury may find it
extremely difficult to ascertain whether the initial questioning
of the child tainted her perception and memory. When the
child is so young that it is unlikely that he or she will qualify as
a witness, the interviewer knows that the statement elicited
will most probably constitute the chief evidence against the
accused.
In Wright, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically noted that
Dr. Jambura failed to record the interview on videotape, but
the majority opinion in the United States Supreme Court re-
jected "the apparently dispositive weight placed by the Idaho
court on the lack of procedural safeguards at the interview." 0
It explained that "[o]ut-of-court statements made by children
218. Even circuits that are unwilling to admit grand jury testimony under
the residual exception will admit the testimony on a waiver theory when the
defendant has caused the declarant's death. Under these circumstances, the
courts have found a waiver of the right to confrontation as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant's com-
plicity must be shown by preponderance of evidence), cert denied, 467 U.S.
1204 (1984); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 632 (5th Cir.) (clear and
convincing standard used for determining whether defendant caused unavaila-
bility), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). This result accords with the Supreme
Court's approach to waiver. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
219. Other examples of children being manipulated by their interviewers
abound. See, e.g., Douglas Besherov, Protecting the Innocent, NATIONAL RE-
VIEW, Feb. 19, 1990, at 44 ("As the McMartin case demonstrates, for young chil-
dren, the basic issue is whether an interviewer has used leading or suggestive
techniques to implant a distorted or untrue version of such abuse in a child's
mind."); Dorthy Rabinowitz, From the Mouths of Babes to a Jail Cell, HARP-
ERS, May 1990, at 52, 61 ("Perhaps the most important witness for the prosecu-
tion [in the Michael's case] was not a child or a parent but Bronx psychologist
Eileen Tracy... [concerning whom a New Jersey trial judge had previously
remarked] Ms. Tracy's questioning gently but surely led [the child] where Ms.
Tracy wanted to take him.' The judge was convinced .. .that Tracy would
have been able to elicit the same accusations from children who had not been
abused."); see also, Debra C. Moss, Are the Children Lying? 73 A.B.A. J. 58
(1987).
220. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3148.
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regarding sexual abuse arise in a wide variety of circumstances,
and we do not believe the Constitution imposes a fixed set of
procedural prerequisites to the admission of such statements at
trial."22 1 Although a requirement of videotaping all statements
by children might lead to the loss of valuable, spontaneous out-
bursts to persons such as neighbors and teachers,222 premedi-
tated prosecutorial questioning should be put into a different
category. When the police send a child for an interview with a
person whom officers selected and informed about the identity
of the alleged perpetrator, special safeguards are needed to en-
sure that the child is not led to make the accusation desired by
the authorities hiring the interviewer.2 23
In such cases, a record of the agent's questions is needed as
a constraint on prosecutorial power. The vulnerability of the
witness, the high potential for the witness's absence at trial,
and the pressures on the prosecutor to get a conviction are fac-
tors that mandate an extraordinary safeguard. Especially in
cases in which the community has succumbed to hysteria, the
jury needs to know the extent to which the prosecution has
contributed to the furor by manipulating the children through
the interview process.22 4 A child's statement to a prosecutor or
prosecutorial agent should not be admitted regardless of
whether it is reliable or the child is produced, unless a contem-
poraneous recording is available. At the very least, this re-
quirement will ensure that the jury hears the child's version
rather that the witness's paraphrase. 22 Such a requirement
may also have a prophylactic effect in preventing some of the
abuses that currently occur.
221. Ic-
222. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
223. For discussion of a child's susceptibility to suggestions by authority fig-
ure, see Mary Ann King & John Yuille, Suggestibility and the Child Witness,
in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 24-25 (S. Ceci, et al. eds., 1987).
224. See supra notes 31-36.
225. In Wright, the witness summarized his conclusion about the child's re-
sponse without making any effort to recall her actual words. For example, the
witness testified as follows about the child's supposed statement that most di-
rectly implicated her father in sexually abusing her:
"Q. And then what did you say and her response?"
"A. When I asked her 'Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee' she did ad-
nit to that."
110 S. Ct. at 3148. A prosecutorial restraint model would protect the defend-
ant against the creations of a witness.
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CONCLUSION
If the Confrontation Clause is to play any part in protect-
ing the public against the government-a goal that makes sense
on both historical and contemporary grounds-then the right to
confrontation must be viewed as more than an alternative
statement of an evidentiary rule. In deciding the admissibility
of hearsay statements, courts should pay attention to the gov-
ernment's role in creating those statements. Curtailing con-
frontation upsets the grand scheme of the Sixth Amendment
because it prevents the prosecution's effect on evidence from
being fully explored by a jury at a public trial.
Diminution of the right to confrontation is inconsistent
with the aims of the Bill of Rights. The failure to hold state-
ments elicited by the prosecution to a higher standard of admis-
sibility defeats the objective of protecting the individual against
the power of the government and interferes with the jury's his-
torical function of guarding our civil liberties.

